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Summary 
There are numerous analyses trying to explain the outcome of the 2016 referendum on 
Britain‟s membership of the EU. The aim of this dissertation is to examine the 
circumstances under which voters‟ attitudes were formed, and ultimately reflected in 
their choice on polling day. The study focuses particularly on the referendum campaign 
and the various psychological operations applied to British citizens, shaping their 
opinion and affecting their final decision. 
First of all, this contribution attempts to develop the basic aspects of modern 
psychological operations (PSYOP), which have been known by many other names or 
terms, including Propaganda. The term is used to denote any action which is practiced 
mainly by psychological methods with the objective of evoking a planned 
psychological reaction in other people. Various techniques are used, aiming to 
influence a target audience's value system, belief system, emotions, motives, 
reasoning, or behaviour. In this context, the first chapter defines the word „propaganda‟ 
and presents significant facts about its origins and examples of its usage in history. 
Subsequently, based on an extensive literature review, it provides a thorough analysis 
about a wide range of propaganda devices. This includes tactics involving language 
manipulation, as well as non-verbal techniques, such as opinion polls and statistics. 
In accordance with the above, the second chapter elaborates on Britain‟s EU 
referendum and attempts to explain the Brexit result. Unlike other academic research, 
this paper considers the outcome of the referendum within the broader context of a 
detailed analysis of public attitude towards the EU. This attempt requires examining 
the circumstances which gave rise to the plebiscite before turning to the issue of how 
the various strategies that were employed during the referendum campaign influenced 
the position of British electorate on polling day.  The paper gives a concise but rich 
survey of the development of Euroscepticism in Britain, a phenomenon that provoked 
considerable debate on the UK‟s membership in the EU, and eventually led to the 
resolution of holding a national referendum on the matter. Following that, it devotes a 
fair number of pages describing the referendum campaign itself – its personalities, 
principal themes and arguments – and seeks to identify the particular tactics that were 
used by the two opposing sides to sway voters. It highlights David Cameron‟s failure 
to secure a substantive deal regarding Britain‟s terms of membership with the EU and 
outlines the key messages of the Remain and Leave campaigns, with the former 
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focusing on the economic and security risks of leaving, and the latter on immigration 
and sovereignty. Most importantly, the study emphasizes the prevalence of propaganda 
techniques throughout the referendum campaign, with reference to the insight of some 
of the key players on both sides. Last but not least, based on a review of the 
campaigns‟ strategies, there is an attempt to determine all those factors that may have 
attributed to the result of Brexit, and caused a historical moment in British history. 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Britain has been debating the advantages and disadvantages of membership in a 
European Community of nations almost since the idea was broached. It decided to hold 
the first referendum on its continued membership of the European Economic Area in 
1975, almost two years after it joined. A second one was held forty-one years later, 
after Prime Minister David Cameron promised a national referendum on EU 
membership, considering of settling the question to the public once and for all. The 
date for the further „in-out‟ referendum was set for 23rd of June 2016, and the battle to 
keep Britain inside the EU began. 
Admittedly, Britain‟s relationship with the EU differs from that of its European 
partners. It is true that the United Kingdom had never been sympathetic to the 
European ideal, with the media and political class reinforcing for decades an anti-
European sentiment to British people. Hence, Britain experienced one the most heated, 
and divisive, political campaign, with the two opposing sides –Remain and Leave – 
employing a wide range of psychological warfare strategies to manipulate public‟s 
vote. According to a growing number of scholars, Brexit was the outcome of a 
combination of proven psychological operations – the same tactics the military deploys 
in order to effect mass sentiment change. The two official campaigns, ‗Britain 
Stronger in Europe‘ and ‗Vote Leave‘ found specific ways to research the voters‟ 
emotional states about particular issues regarding the EU and, subsequently, they 
created messages that elicited a particular voting response in British citizens. 
Psychological warfare, also known as „Propaganda‟, constitutes an enterprise of 
winning the „hearts and minds‟ of people. Unlike the past, when propaganda was 
mainly found in print newspapers, there are nowadays serious consequences of social 
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media being also used as a tool to distribute propaganda and manipulate public 
opinion. In this context, the campaigners of both sides deployed all the available means 
to target individuals – particularly those parts of the electorate identified as crucial to 
the result – in order to launch a great deal of information that resonate with the voters 
in an emotional way. Regardless of its validity, that piece of information was used for 
the sole purpose of influencing public‟s decision on polling day. Ultimately, Britain‟s 
EU referendum campaign, and its surprise outcome, offers valuable insights for 
political campaigns all over the world.  
 
 
CHAPTER ONE: OVERVIEW OF PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS 
 
A. Definition and analysis 
 
 „Psychological Operations‟ (PSYOPS) is another term used for „Propaganda‟, and 
refers to planned operations that convey selected information to target audiences such 
as organizations, groups and individuals in order to influence their value system, belief 
system, emotions and motives. In particular, there is an effort to affect the behavior and 
attitudes in favor of one particular interest or issue
1. The term “Psychological 
Operations” was first used by U.S Army referring to the use of psychological 
techniques of persuasion for war propaganda purposes. During wartime, the major aim 
is to diminish enemy‟s morale and at the same time to maintain the allies‟ morale 
within rival countries. Propaganda constitutes the main device of Political Warfare. 
Covert ways of communication – such as the drop of leaflets by a bomber – enable the 
dissemination of reports inside the enemy's stronghold with damaging consequences. 
The approach towards the enemy and to his subject people is hostile, while the attitude 
towards the friendly or still neutral countries and their people has a manipulative 
character. In one occasion, there is an effort to cause disruption to the enemies‟ front 
and destroy their confidence, while the other approach serves to stay reconciled with 
the friendly countries and build bonds of trust. The first one requires the mindset and 
methodology of destabilizing and subverting, while the second one suggests directness 
                                                          
1
 Psychological Operations/ Warfare, Major Ed Rouse  http://www.psywarrior.com/psyhist.html  
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and intelligence information sharing.  
However, an extended use of the term is made nowadays to refer to all these 
sophisticated techniques of manipulation used not only in politics, but in the 
commercial realm as well. The emergence of a globally interconnected, mass-mediated 
society increased their application and intensity in the last century (Jowett & 
O'Donnell, 2015, Marlin, 2002).More specifically, an extensive range of media and 
tools are utilized to articulate propagandistic messages, which improved as new 
innovated technologies appeared, like posters, animation figures, films, websites and 
radio or TV shows. Nowadays, propaganda is progressing and evolving into a digital 
era, which is characterized by the development of computational propaganda strategies 
that spread bogus or biased news online with the use of bots, algorithms and social 
media (Marin and Dean, 1929). 
Any attempt to define 'Propaganda' requires, first and foremost, an examination of its 
origins. History plays a pivotal role in understanding the concept of this term. Due to 
the fact that the intensive propaganda methods are mainly an instrument of political 
warfare, many people believe that propaganda is something new and modern. The term 
“propaganda” started to be utilized by the public with the outbreak of the World War I 
in 1914. Nobody would presume that “propaganda” is something new, supposing that 
the efforts made in the past to manipulate and guide people‟s opinions had also the 
exact name. ―The battle for men‘s minds is as old as human history‖ (Casey, 1944). 
According to Casey, in most of the ancient civilizations, people used to live under 
despotisms and were not able to express their feelings or formulate their opinions as a 
group due to the lack of methods and tools at that time. However, the Greeks – and 
more specifically the Athenians – were able to convey their feelings and their beliefs, 
as well as their interests. Remarkably, they were also aware of the affairs and the 
problems of the city-state they belonged. Consequently, the differences and arguments 
on political and religious issues gave birth to propaganda and counterpropaganda. 
Although there were not devices such as radio or newspapers, the intelligent Athenians 
created powerful and very effective methods and techniques of propaganda to control 
and form public‟s beliefs and attitudes. Some of these methods were the theater, the 
assembly, the religious festivals and the law courts. Furthermore, they made significant 
use of the oratory to express their points of view, as well as handwritten books in order 
to shape and control the men‟s minds (Casey, 1994). 
Since then, propaganda was used anytime by societies with common knowledge and 
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interests. Already since the sixteenth century some nations applied propaganda 
methods similar to those of the modern propaganda. For instance, in the case of the 
Spanish Armada (1588), Philip II of Spain, as well as Queen Elizabeth of England 
practiced a rather modern form of propaganda. It is noteworthy that some years later 
Sir Walter Raleigh expressed his annoyance about the propaganda used by Spain (even 
though he did not use the exact term). His frustration was caused because of a Spanish 
report about a naval battle close to Azores between the Spanish king's vessels and the 
British ship Revenge. In particular, he claimed that it was ―no marvel that the 
Spaniard should seek by false and slanderous pamphlets, advisoes, and letters, to 
cover their own loss and to derogate from others their own honors, especially in this 
fight being performed far off‖. Subsequently, he recalled the case of the Spanish 
Armada and stated that when Spain intended to invade England, the Spaniards 
published ―in sundry languages, in print, great victories in words, which they pleaded 
to have obtained against this realm; and spread the same in a most false sort over all 
parts of France, Italy, and elsewhere.‖ However, in reality the Spanish Armada 
suffered a devastating defeat. These Spanish declarations, though characterized by the 
language standards of Queen Elizabeth‟s time, with some alterations may sound alike a 
statement made in 1944 by the Japanese propaganda office (Casey, 1944). 
Furthermore, the missionary activities of the Catholic Church were the cause which led 
European people to begin the usage of the term „propaganda‟. The roots of the term 
„propaganda‟ come from the Latin word „propagare‟, which means spread or grow2. In 
1622 Pope Gregory XV established the „Congregation for the Propagation of the 
Faith‟, which was located in Rome. The Congregation for the Propagation of the Faith 
was a commission of cardinals who assigned to expand the regulating church affairs 
and to spread the faith in heathen lands.  Thus, Pope Urban VII created the first 
College of Propaganda to instruct and prepare the priests for that mission. This 
suggests that propaganda is from its roots an ancient and honorable word, since any 
religious activity that was related with that word was treated with great respect from 
humanity (Casey, 1944). Conversely, nowadays the word is completely associated with 
selfishness, dishonesty and deception.  
People were familiarized with the involvement of propaganda on significant issues and 
concerns due to its long lasting existence from the Middle Ages and in the later historic 
                                                          
2
 Oxford dictionary 
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periods down to modern times. Some notable cases, where extensive propaganda was 
applied, were the historic conflict among kings and Parliament in England, the 
movement of American independence and the France Revolution. In France, Voltaire 
and Rousseau aroused opposition to Bourbon rule through their writings and during the 
revolution Danton and his fellows shaped attitudes against the French king, just as the 
writers Adams and Paine had incited people's opinion in the American Revolution. 
Last but not least, propaganda‟s power and triumphs were dramatized throughout 
World War I. In the post-war period, fascists and communists made an excessive use 
of intense revolutionary propaganda aiming to extend their control and influence 
beyond their national borders (Casey, 1944). 
With the passage of time, by using its inventive intelligence, the mankind perfected a 
communicational system which accelerated and extended the influence of information 
and ideas. However, this machinery of communication also provided the propagandists 
a rapid and effective system for the spread of their appeals. Although, this evolutionary 
and innovate technical equipment can be utilized for international good-willing and 
peaceful purposes, Hitler, Mussolini and Tojo preferred to exploit this efficient and 
magnificent mechanism for inhumane reasons and for their own profitable desires and 
preferences. Thus, the definition of propaganda has utterly changed. 
Another stimulus to propaganda was the modern development of politics, as the 
promotion of it is an essential part of political campaigns in democracies.  When 
political leaders used to control nominations, a relatively small promotion was required 
before a candidate was named to operate an office, but under the direct fundamental 
system the candidate who seeks nomination ought to address to a voting constituency. 
Moreover, in the final election he/she must appeal to the electorate for its verdict on his 
capability of running successfully an office and on the credibility of his/her platform. 
In other words, a candidate ―must engage in promotion as a legitimate and necessary 
part of a political contest‖ (Casey, 1944). Subsequently, it is essential for political 
leaders in power to clarify and explain their courses of action to voters. More 
specifically, those in power, such as presidents, prime ministers, heads of departments 
and cabinet members, aim to reconcile the demands of various groups in the society by 
using means of persuasion. They use propaganda techniques in an effort to justify a 
particular policy and make a proposed measure clearly understood and widely accepted 
by the public. 
Last but not least, the volume of propaganda has been expanded due to recent 
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economic changes. For the purpose of selling commodities and services the methods of 
public relations and propaganda have been greatly developed, under the circumstances 
of mass production and mass consumption. There have been many attempts of clearly 
define and analyze the meaning of propaganda and also loads of considerations and 
debates about the proper and the most effective use of it in a way that it could be 
beneficial for humanity. 
As Randal Marlin notes, we should think propaganda as a ―systematic, motivated 
attempt to influence the thinking and behavior of others through means that impede or 
circumvent a propagandee‘s ability to appreciate the nature of this influence‖ (Marlin, 
2002). From the World War I and II, when propaganda was used to move entire 
nations, up to the present many people have tried to recognize the tactics used by 
propagandists. Scholars have identified various standard techniques and each of them 
chooses a different way to analyze them. Randal Marlin states that they can be 
separated in many categories; verbal and non-verbal forms of propaganda, techniques 
that appeal to ethos (convince an audience of your credibility or character), to pathos 
(persuade an audience by appealing to their emotions) and others devoted to persuasion 
by logos, or argument. There are also large-scale strategies, which include and 
combine a whole range of techniques. 
B. Propaganda: Techniques involving Language Manipulation 
 
1. Basic Propaganda Devices 
 
The most well-known and compact list of propaganda tactics was created by the 
Institute for Propaganda Analysis (IPA). This New York-based Institute was 
established in 1937 due to general concern that the widespread propaganda was 
decreasing the public‟s ability to think critically, and suspended its operations in late 
October 1941 when the United States prepared to enter the war. The purpose of the 
Institution was to educate American public about the nature of political propaganda 
and understand the techniques by which propaganda is spread. IPA was composed of 
social scientists and journalists and it published a series of books, including; The Fine 
Art of Propaganda, Propaganda Analysis, Group Leader‘s Guide to Propaganda 
Analysis, Propaganda: How To Recognize and Deal With It (Jowett & O'Donnell, 
2015, Delviche, 2018). This Institute identified the following seven basic devices 
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which are so frequently reproduced and widely quoted in lectures, articles, and 
textbooks that ―they have become virtually synonymous with the practice and analysis 
of propaganda in all of its aspects‖(Combs & Nimmo, 1993). 
Name-Calling: The name-calling technique links a person, or idea, to a negative word 
or symbol and is a powerful force for influencing opinion because names are easily 
remembered. It is used to arouse prejudice and make us reject and condemn a person or 
idea without examining the evidence. Words like “terrorist”, “racist”, “”sexist” carry 
powerful emotional overtones and politicians sometimes resort to this kind of  labels 
during political campaigns or public events with the intentions of gaining advantage 
over, or defending themselves from, an opponent or critic. 
Glittering Generality: This is defined as associating something with highly valued 
concepts and beliefs. It could be considered as the opposite of “name-calling” as it 
links a person, or idea, to a positive symbol. Propagandists employ vague, sweeping 
statements (often slogans or simple catchphrases) including intentionally virtue words 
such as “honor”, “democracy”, “peace”, “family”. The use of these words, without 
context or specific definitions provided, serves the sole purpose of evoking certain 
feelings to the audience. These feelings later translate into unquestioning approval of 
whatever the propagandist states. Magedah Shabo gives certain examples in her book 
and notes that glittering generalities can make or break a candidate‟s campaign.  
Example: ―I stand for freedom: for a strong nation, unrivaled in the world. My 
opponent believes we must compromise in these ideals, but I believe they are our 
birthright.‖ 
Other words with strong positive connotations that constitute popular glittering 
generalities are “freedom/liberty”, “strength”, “security”, “prosperity”, “choice”, 
“equality”, “change”. 
Transfer: The Institute of Propaganda Analysis defines this term as a device by which 
the propagandist carries over the authority, sanction, and prestige of something 
respected and revered to something else in order to make the latter acceptable. 
Symbols are constantly employed to stir public‟s emotions and win peoples‟ approval. 
More specifically, propagandists attempt to transfer the status of a beloved symbol to 
the cause they represent. For example, the cross represents the Christian Church and 
the flag represents the nation. A politician could close their speech with a public 
prayer, attempting to transfer religious prestige to the ideas they are advocating or 
could be photographed in front of the country's flag to project patriotism.  
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Transfer is a very common device in political spectrum. Randal Marlin explains that 
there are legitimate and illegitimate uses of this method. It is legitimate when it is used 
to represent fairly what a party stands for. If a candidate plans to increase public 
subsidies for mass transit once he/she is elected, then it helps to be seen riding a bus. 
However, it is illegitimate when it is used unfairly to pretend the candidate is in favor 
of something that he/she is truly not. There are publicity-seeking candidates who try to 
take credit through photo-opportunities for projects they have never got involved with 
or take pictures with senior political icons to share the latters‟ prestige even if they 
never shared the same views. The reverse of this is publicizing footage of opponents in 
the presence of people who have earned the contempt of the community in order to 
suggest the connection between the candidates and the others. The “Transfer” 
technique is considered more subliminal (operating on a subconscious rather than 
conscious level) than other techniques. (Hoyt, 2018) 
Testimonial: In the Institute‟s definition, the Testimonial Device ―consists in having 
some respected or hated person say that a given idea or program or product or person 
is good or bad‖. A testimonial is an endorsement. This technique has usually a well-
known figure endorse, recommend or disapprove of a product, cause or program. The 
more famous or respected an individual is, the more powerful their testimonial will be 
in the eyes of the public. This appeal to authority may include the use of celebrities and 
public personalities who have well established and trusted public brands, the use of 
experts, clerics, police, scientists and others whose title is respected, as soon as, people 
who are like the people whose support the propagandist needs. By simply citing a 
qualified source, getting them support your case with vigor on TV shows or/and stand 
up on stage with you in political debates, the testimonial technique can be used to 
construct a balanced argument. As Randal Marlin notices, this method encourages the 
propagandist‟s audience to accept ideas without subjecting them to critical 
examination. However, this source should be credible in the context of the speaker‟s 
claim. The most common misuse of the testimonial involves citing individuals who are 
not qualified to make judgements about a particular issue. For example, in 2016, Lady 
Gaga supported Hillary Clinton, and Clint Eastwood threw his weight behind Donald 
Trump. Although they are both popular performers, there is no reason to think they 
necessarily know what is best for the United States (Delviche, 2018). Last but not least, 
making vague references to experts without naming specific names or details is also a 
variation of the testimonial device. 
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Examples: ―Many doctors claim that …‖, ―All of the greatest legal minds agree …‖ 
Plain Folks: The plain folks technique is an attempt by the propagandists to convince 
their audience that they, and their ideas, are “of the people”/”the plain folks” by 
presenting themselves to the public as the everyday man, ―just like you‖. It is designed 
to make ordinary citizens be related with a political candidate or other figure that they 
otherwise may have nothing in common with. People like to vote for someone who 
“speaks their language” and can understand and empathize with their concerns. This is 
why “plain folks” is used most in politics. Politicians usually come from prestigious 
backgrounds and have hefty bank accounts. However, they try to give the illusion that 
they are normal people, from humble origins and ordinary lives by doing activities in 
public, such as attending church services, showing devotion to little children and pets 
or going fishing. The images of George Bush wearing denims and a plaid shirt while 
relaxing at Camp David or Bill Clinton eating at McDonalds are all examples of using 
this technique. 
By using plain language and mannerisms, the propagandist gives the people a sense of 
trust making them believe that they share common goals and eventually agree with 
him/her.  
Card Stacking: This method requires skill and ingenuity. Propagandist uses this 
technique to give an unfair advantage to one point of view and make the best case 
possible for his/her side, while weakening the opposing viewpoint. More specifically, 
the Institution defines “card-stacking” as ―the selection and use of facts and 
falsehoods, illustrations or distractions, and logical or illogical statements in order to 
give the best or the worst possible case for an idea, program, person or product.‖ The 
arguments used in this device may be honest, in terms of the information shared, and 
convincing because they rely on sound reasoning and facts. However, they are 
misleading because they present information out of context, ignore contrary opinions 
on issues, omit serious details or conceal important facts (Shabo, 2008). The true facts 
are twisted by the propagandist who uses only the information and evidence that 
support his/her ideas and suit his/her interest. This one-sided effect is commonly used 
in political campaigns, in both written and visual propaganda. It can be accomplished 
by stating your favored view first and choosing an appropriate mix of speakers in 
debates to confirm your ideas and make them dominant. Making your opinion visually 
noticeable, while letting the undesirable information be printed in a smaller typeface or 
some way visually obscured, could also be possible ways of using this technique. 
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Randal Marlin stresses that “card-stacking” covers a large area, considering the 
frequent and extended misuses of statistics and polls. The aim of "stacking cards 
against the truth" is for the audience to be impressed. Propagandists try to control the 
beliefs of their followers by making assume that these facts are conclusive. This 
unfairly representation of the situation is dangerously deceptive and hard to detect as it 
does not provide all of the information necessary for the audience to make an informed 
decision (Shabo, 2008, Marlin, 2002, Crouch, 2018, McDonald & Palmer, 2015).  
Bandwagon: Propagandists use this device to persuade the viewer or listener to follow 
the crowd and “jump on the bandwagon”.  This technique creates the impression of 
widespread support and it capitalizes on the human desire to be a member of the 
winning team. It is based on the premise that “since so many other people are doing it, 
it must be good, or at least acceptable”. According to this concept, the group addressed 
should accept the propagandist‟s program, join the crowd and align with the most 
popular, successful side of the issue. Simultaneously, there is the implication that 
everyone who refuses to follow the mass movement will be isolated. The feeling of 
loneliness and the fear of exclusion also play a role in the bandwagon effect (Crouch, 
2018, Hoyt, 2018). 
The bandwagon device explains why there are fashion trends and is also very effective 
when used in religious and political propaganda. For example, it is highly observed 
during elections that the increasing popularity of a candidate or party encourages 
people‟s support. Citizens tend to vote those candidates or parties who are likely to win 
(or are proclaimed as such by the media), hoping to be part of the “winning team” in 
the end. Especially in situations involving majority opinion, such as political outcomes, 
people may ignore or override their own beliefs and alter their opinion to accord to the 
majority view (McAllister & Studlar, 1991). During the 1992 U.S. presidential 
election, a study was conducted at a large northeastern university and the results were 
published in “The Journal of Consumer Research (1996)”. Some volunteer business 
students were given the results of student and national polls indicating that Bill Clinton 
was in the lead. Many of them who had intended to vote for Bush changed their minds 
after seeing the poll results (Morwitz & Pluzinski, 1996). 
 
There is a variety of other techniques in which language is used to manipulate an 
audience. Ιn this research, there will be presented some further interesting examples of 
propaganda methods, drawing on the work of many scholars, for a more accurate, clear 
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and complete view. It is worth noting that many of the definitions are associated with 
or complement the ones listed above, subsisting on the same basic principles. 
 
J.A.C. Brown, in his 1963 book ―Techniques of persuasion: From propaganda to 
brainwashing‖, compiled a list of such deceptive practices involving language. 
The Use of Stereotypes: This is similar to Name-calling device. Brown outlines that 
there is a natural tendency to „type‟ people in terms of their racial, ethnic, or cultural 
characteristics. Stereotypes ignore individual identity and categorize people into 
specific groups. There is an exaggerated belief that, within these groups, members act 
alike and share the same beliefs and attitudes. Hence the stereotypes of the black 
people, the Jew, the capitalist constitute a type of discrimination as these people‟s 
reactions are explained in terms of the group they belong. Stereotyping creates also 
prejudice as assumptions about particular categories of people are transformed into 
"realities". 
Examples: ―Blonde women are unintelligent‖, ―Blacks are great athletes‖, ―Asians 
are very smart and technology savvy‖, ―Women are bad drivers‖, ―All teenagers are 
rebels‖ 
Downright Lying: One obvious way to manipulate is simply to lie. However, the liar 
loses credibility once the falsehood gets detected. Therefore, propagandists lie to 
achieve a specific goal in short-terms (Marlin, 2002). Brown reports among others the 
example of Hitler‟s recommendation of the Big Lie. The expression was conceived by 
Hitler, when he dictated his Mein Kampf  book, about the use of a lie so "colossal" that 
no one would believe that someone "could have the impudence to distort the truth so 
infamously". 
Repetition:  As Brown states, a propagandist is confident that, “if he repeats a 
statement often enough, it will in time come to be accepted by his audience‖. Phrases 
regularly mentioned, such as slogans and key words play a large part in advertising and 
politics. Repetition is used so frequently because it is easy and effective. By simply 
repeating a “catchy” word or sentence, emphasis is provided to the statements and 
people listening will remember it any time they think about that certain subject 
(Whitney, 2013). 
A notable example is Martin Luther King‟s famous speech by American civil rights, 
which included the phrase “I have a dream” a number of times. This made his speech 
very powerful and memorable. 
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Further Examples: ―Keep the World Safe for Democracy‖, ―Fair Shares for All‖ 
Assertion: Many authors mention this technique. Eleanor Maclean in her 1981 book 
―Between the lines‖ and Magedah Shabo in her 2008 book ―Techniques and 
Persuasion‖ make an extensive reference to “assertion” considering it as the first and 
the simplest form of propaganda. Brown outlines that bold assertions in favor of the 
propagandist‟s thesis aim for the deliberate limitation of free thought and questioning. 
This method consists of simply stating debatable ideas as facts, with little or no 
explanation or justification (Shabo, 2008). Sometimes dubious claims are followed by 
expressions like “unquestionable”, “undeniably” or “as everyone knows” (Maclean, 
1981). 
Examples: ―The Middle East will never be at peace‖, ―Richard Williams obviously 
doesn‘t have the experience it takes to be President of the United States‖ 
Pinpointing the Enemy: Brown claims that it is helpful if a speaker or writer ―can put 
forth a message which is not only for something, but also against some real or 
imagined enemy‖. By presenting a specific cause, person or group as enemy, 
propagandists simplify a complex situation. This technique is extremely used during 
wartime but it is also observed in political debates and campaigns
3
. An example 
provided by Brown is the Nazi campaigns against the Jews and the „plutodemocracies‟. 
The author underlines that this was an attempt to blame selected targets in order to 
direct aggression away from the propagandist and his party, as well as to strengthen in-
group feelings and improve party morale. 
Further Examples
4: ―The reason there are so many people unemployed in America is 
because of Barack Obama‖,  ―McDonald‘s is the reason for obesity in America‖. 
The Appeal to Authority:  This is related to “Testimonial Device”. The propagandist 
relies his/her arguments on an authority that appears to be an expert on the specific 
subject. Based on the credibility of this “expert”, the propagandist tries to persuade the 
audience that he/she is right and gain support. The authorities appealed to are usually 
religious figures, people working on science, or professors.  
Examples: ―Scientists have found that eating cooked meat causes cancer‖, 
―Drinking is morally wrong because this is what the pastor of the local church said in 
his sermon‖ 
                                                          
3
   https://unitas.wordpress.com/2007/07/11/propaganda-techniques/   
4
   http://www.learnquebec.ca/documents/20181/267969/006-Propaganda_101-Student_Resources.pdf/d5e11bf9-d917-4ad5-95c9-
acec19ea17d1?version=1.0 
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Eleanor Maclean‟s list on propaganda practices will also be examined. Although her 
book ―Between the lines‖ supplements the theory above, she chooses to give more 
emphasis on techniques that could be subcategories of the “Card-stacking” method.  
Selective Omission: There are also legal terms in Latin referred to this device; namely 
suppressio veri with suggestio falsi, meaning “a suppression of truth is equivalent to an 
expression of falsehood”5. The propagandist selects to omit certain facts or 
circumstances connected with an event, in order to form a false impression and deceive 
the audience. He/she does not lie, but neither tells the whole truth. Randal Marlin tries 
to illustrate Maclean‟s definitions by giving real-life examples in his own book. He 
presents the case of a politician who has to vote on a bill which combines both 
acceptable and unbearable measures for the public. He notes that it is selective 
omission to report that the politician voted against the positive measures without 
mentioning that the bill also included the other, unacceptable features (Marlin, 2002). 
Quoting Out of Context: This is relevant to selective omission. The propagandist 
reproduces deliberately a part of what someone said (selective quotation) in order to 
prove that this person holds views that, in fact, they do not hold. The ultimate purpose 
of this “trick” is to distort, alter, or even reverse the originally intended meaning of the 
quote according to the propagandist‟s interest (Cline, 2018).  Statements meant 
ironically may not be conveyed as such, thereby, the concept presented eventually is 
exactly the opposite of what was intended. ( Maclean, 1981, Cline, 2018). Quoting out 
of context is a tactic mainly used in politics where opposition party quotes the 
statements of the others, in such a way, to serve its interest and ruin the opponent's 
reputation. 
Examples: (Original statements): 
 1.―This has been the best play I've seen all year! Of course, it is the only play I've seen 
all year‖. 2.―This was a fantastic movie, as long as you aren't looking for plot or 
character development‖ 
(Selective Quotation):  
1.―This has been the best play which he has seen this year‖. 2.―This is a fantastic 
movie‖ 
Meshing fact with opinion: Sometimes opinions and facts are mixed. Propagandists 
                                                          
5
 https://dictionary.thelaw.com/suppressio-veri-expressio-falsi/  
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may present their personal belief or judgement and support it with facts in order to 
manipulate their audience. Maclean notes that we need to pay attention to the language 
used when a statement is made because ―opinion can be concealed behind claims that 
appear to be purely factual‖. In her given example, ―Southern Africa is being overrun 
by Communists‖, she urged us to examine and evaluate what the words connote. She 
notices that the definition of the term “Communist” may not be limited here to card-
carrying Communist Party Members and the verb “overrun” expresses the speaker‟s 
belief that there are too many of the designated group in the area. The facts 
propagandists choose to present and the way they choose to present them reflect the 
argument they are trying to make (Gonçalves, 2016). 
 
Last but not least, various academic sources focus on emotional appeals, as a 
successful way used extensively by propagandists to influence public opinion. Widely 
reported as most important is the appeal to fear; 
Scare Tactics or Appeal to Fear: Propagandists employ this method by warning people 
of the serious repercussions that will result if they do not act in a particular way. As 
Aaron Delviche states, ―By playing on the audience‘s deep-seated fears, practitioners 
of this technique hope to redirect attention away from the merits of a particular 
proposal and toward steps that can be taken to reduce the fear.‖ Plenty of empirical 
studies have been conducted in respect of fear appeals and their effectiveness. 
According to a brief review of this research, a successful fear appeal includes four 
elements: 1) a threat, 2) a particular recommendation about how the public should 
behave, 3) public‟s perception that the recommendation will help to cope effectively 
with the threat, and 4) public‟s perception that they are capable of implementing the 
recommended attitude (Delviche, 2018). 
The fear appeal is a prevalent technique in contemporary politics. Politicians attempt to 
intensify people‟s uncertainty, doubt and fear about immigration, guns or some 
external threat, while promising that they will reduce the threat if they are voted. 
 
In conclusion, it is worth noting that there are many additional “tricks” extensively 
used by propagandists in order to manipulate and shape public‟s opinion. Skilled 
rhetoricians can attribute a different meaning to a sentence by using the passive voice 
or selected verbs and adverbs with the desired ambiguity. This indefiniteness is an 
attempt to conceal or reveal as much as they wish (Marlin, 2002). Randal Marlin 
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emphasizes that there can be verbal expressions, for example, that ―impute intention to 
a doer more definitely, or to a higher degree, in relation to some consequence‖. The 
statement “A caused B‟s death” gives a lower degree of culpability rather than “A 
killed B”. Accordingly, the imprecision and the deliberate omission of certain words 
may completely change the meaning of a sentence and create false impression. 
Provided that the killing was an accident, the assertion that “A killed B”, without 
further details, leaves open the possibility that the killing was an intentional act. The 
failure to mention the word “accidentally” may lead to a wrong conclusion (Marlin, 
2002). 
 
2. Logical Fallacies 
 
Of equal importance to the propaganda devices mentioned above are “Logical 
Fallacies”, which constitute a separate sector in propaganda analysis. Since the time of 
Plato and Aristotle, common fallacies in reasoning were at the center of philosophers‟ 
interest, mainly for avoiding making such mistakes. However, these misconceptions 
can be used immorally to deceive an audience (Marlin, 2002). More specifically, 
fallacies and propaganda techniques are associated by nature, as they overlap, are often 
used in combination, and do not always fit simply into one category or another 
(Mckeever, 2005).  Propagandists' desire to persuade makes the conscious and habitual 
use of fallacies as rhetorical devices prevail. The following list of language-linked 
fallacies dates back to Aristotle and earlier and is based principally on Randal Marlin‟s 
book. 
The Ad Hominem Argument: This Latin phrase literally means “to the person”. In 
logic and rhetoric, ad hominems refer to personal attacks (Ferrer, 2018). ―An ad 
hominem fallacy redirects the discussion of an issue to a discussion of one of the 
subjects—to his or her personal failings, inconsistency, or bias‖ (Mckeever, 2005). It 
is fallacious to reject someone‟s view on the basis of their bad character. In particular, 
ad hominem arguments are a fallacy of relevance where someone criticizes another 
person's claim due to his/her personal characteristics, background, physical 
appearance, or other features irrelevant to the argument at issue (Ferrer, 2018). For 
example, a good policy does not change merely because a bad person advocates it. The 
assumption that it does is sometimes called the ―genetic fallacy‖. We need to examine 
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the policy on its own merits and not on the character of the person supporting it, in 
order to avoid unsound reasoning (Marlin, 2002). Undoubtedly, ad hominem 
arguments are very common in politics, where the undermining of the opponent's 
credibility is a vital component of effective rhetoric. Especially in political campaigns, 
instead of addressing the candidate‟s attitude on the issues, or addressing his/her 
effectiveness as a politician, a propagandist may focus on personality issues, speech 
patterns, outfit, style, and other things that affect popularity but have no relation with 
candidate's competence. In this way, propagandists try to influence the voters 
unethically by appealing to unrelated foibles instead of addressing core issues. 
False Cause: It is a logical error to think that simply because one incident follows 
another, the first causes the second. This fallacy is sometimes called ―post hoc, ergo 
propter hoc‖ (“after this, therefore because of this”) (Marlin, 2002). Randal Marlin 
underlines that ―the attribution of causality cannot be established merely by the 
temporal sequence‖. According to Rosemary Mckeever, who agrees with Randal 
Marlin, causal fallacy is the result of incorrectly identifying the causes of occurrences 
either by oversimplifying or by misinterpreting a statistical correlation for a cause. She 
notes that oversimplifying happens when people attribute to a single cause a complex 
causal network.  
Example: ―Poor performance in schools is caused by poverty6‖. Poverty is certainly a 
factor contributing to poor academic performance but it is not the only one. 
On the other hand, mistaking correlation for cause occurs when we assume a causal 
connection between two unrelated events which happen at the same time, either 
coincidentally or because they are both results of the same cause (Mckeever, 2005). 
Example: ―Eating more ice cream in the summer causes an increase in crime rates‖. 
By giving this example, Mckeever stresses how a statistical correlation can lead to a 
logical fallacy. Although the rates for ice-cream consuming and violent crimes both 
increase each summer, under no circumstances the first causes the second. Yet, the 
simultaneous rise of these phenomena may be a result of a common cause, like hot 
weather (Mckeever, 2005). Likewise, we cannot make assumptions about causation 
without clear evidence. For instance, if we observe that, among octogenarians, fewer 
smokers have been diagnosed with Alzheimer‟s than nonsmokers, it is fallacious to 
conclude that smoking helps prevent this disease (Marlin, 2002). 
                                                          
6
 https://unitas.wordpress.com/2007/07/11/propaganda-techniques 
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Hasty Generalization: Hasty generalizations are general statements hastily made and 
supported by little or no evidence. More specifically, these statements are drawn as 
unwarranted conclusions about how a whole class of people behave, taking as 
reference only a small sample. For example, someone may have a bad experience with 
a lawyer and, therefore, make the blanket accusation that all lawyers are unscrupulous 
(Marlin, 2002). Moreover, when the sample is too biased to support a conclusion, it 
also constitutes hasty generalization. For instance, a survey is conducted of ten million 
households, selected from all fifty states, and yet all of them being Democrat. National 
election's result could not be predicted sufficiently, based merely on this evidence 
(Mckeever, 2005). 
Last but not least, Ferrer highlights in his article that these general claims may lead to 
some sort of illicit assumption, overstatement, exaggeration, or even stereotypes 
(Ferrer, 2018). 
Ignoring the Question: Randal Marlin characterizes it as a “time-honored” device, as it 
is widely used by officials who face some damaging accusation by the media. In 
practice, the person asked diverts the questioning by answering to some different issue, 
ignoring the actual question completely. The author presents the case in British 
Columbia in 1997, when the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) clashed with 
demonstrators and used pepper-spray to control the crowd. When the Canadian Prime 
Minister Jean Chrétien asked about this action, he joked and responded that he put 
pepper on his plate (Marlin, 2002). 
Ignoring the Logical Force and Direction of an Argument: This is one of the main 
types of logical fallacies to which scholars attribute many different names, like 
"Smokescreen" or "Red-herring" fallacy
7
. It is also known as ―Ignoratio elenchi‖ 
(literally in Latin; “ignorance of the refutation”) because it produces eventually a 
totally irrelevant conclusion. According to this tactic, a speaker attempts to redirect the 
argument to another topic to which he/she can better respond. While it is similar to 
“Ignoring the Question”, the difference lies upon the deliberate diversion of attention 
in order to distract and confuse the audience. In this case, there is an effort to replace 
the lack of real arguments, abandon the original subject of the discussion and introduce 
a separate issue. Typically, the argument given in response seems to be relevant but is 
                                                          
7
 The phrase “red herring” refers to a kippered herring (salted herring-fish) which is quite pungent and has a very strong odor. 
According to legend, this aroma was so strong and delectable to animals that it served for training the hunting dogs and for testing 
how well they could track a scent without getting distracted. Dogs are not generally used for hunting fish so a red herring is a 
distraction from what he is supposed to be hunting. https://thebestschools.org/magazine/15-logical-fallacies-know  
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not really on-topic (Ferrer, 2018, Mckeever, 2005). This fallacy of relevance is very 
common when the person asked does not like the current topic and deviates from it in 
order to speak about a more preferred matter- usually something easier or safer to 
address (Ferrer, 2018). Randal Marlin argues that this challenge may require clever 
reasoning abilities through the development of the argument, combined with some 
sentiment. He stresses that when passions are aroused, people are manipulated more 
easily. Besides, ―building up emotional indignation can result in easier bridging of 
this logical gap‖ (Marlin, 2002). 
For example, an argument stating that a given crime is odious and needs to be punished 
does not really answer the question whether the person accused committed such a 
crime (Marlin, 2002). 
Finally, politics is another arena where the use of this fallacy is widespread. Political 
figures are familiar with this technique and use it mainly to mislead the general public. 
For instance, Donald Trump was asked during the second presidential debate about 
some recordings from 2005 –in which he is heard making degrading comments about 
women to Billy Bush. He responded by changing the topic to ISIS, in an effort to make 
his taped comments appear unimportant in comparison.  
―This was locker room talk. I‘m not proud of it. I apologized to my family. I apologized 
to the American people. (…) You know what, we have a world where you have ISIS 
chopping off heads, where you have men frankly drowning people in steel cages, where 
you have wars (…).Yes, I‘m very embarrassed by it. I hate it. But it‘s a locker room 
talk and it‘s one of those things. I will knock the hell out of ISIS, we‘re going to defeat 
ISIS. ISIS happened a number of years ago in a vacuum that was left because of bad 
judgment. And I will tell you I will take care of ISIS.‖8 (Trump, 2016) 
Begging the Question: This form of fallacy is also called “circular reasoning” or 
“petitio principi” (meaning “assuming the initial [thing]” ). It occurs when a person 
makes a claim and tries to justify it by advancing grounds that actually repeat what is 
assumed beforehand. More specifically, when the justification of a statement leads to a 
conclusion which is equivalent to the original statement, this constitutes “circular 
reasoning” (Ferrer, 2018, Mckeever, 2005, Marlin, 2002). Rosemary Mckeever‟s 
definition explains it more extensively; ―circular reasoning presents as a true premise 
an assertion that actually requires its own proof. This leads to a ―conclusion‖ that has 
                                                          
8
 via https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/10/us/politics/transcript-second-debate.html   
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already been pre-supposed or implied‖. According to Randal Marlin, fanatics are 
particularly prone to this fallacy. Due to the fact that they are overwhelming enthusiast 
and obsessed with they own beliefs and ideas, they cannot understand or accept the 
opposing view. Therefore, they argue heatedly against an opponent projecting that it is 
an issue between them. A frequently-used example of circular arguments is found in a 
debate between theist and atheist. The assertion that God exists because the Bible is 
divinely inspired and assures His existence is a circular argument. It is also circular for 
the atheist to reject the possibility that Bible is divinely inspired because there is no 
God, when this is the very point at issue (Marlin, 2002). 
False Analogy: Drawing analogies between various events, circumstances, or things 
always plays an important part in learning. Correspondingly, people try to explain and 
convince the others about particular situations- or actions- by comparing them with 
former situations (Marlin, 2002). Randal Marlin explicates that false analogy is a 
fallacy of placing excessive weight on similarities rather than dissimilarities. The 
differences, notwithstanding their importance, may be not acknowledged, not clearly 
explained, or simply, ignored. In that case, the analogy is poorly suited and logical 
conclusions cannot be drawn; dissimilarities can often overpower the similarities and, 
therefore, invalidate the specific argument.  
Examples
9: ―People who buy stocks are no different from people who bet on horse 
racing. They both risk their money with little chance of making a big profit.‖  
―Smoking cigarettes is just like ingesting arsenic into your system. Both have been 
shown to be causally related to death.‖ 
Amphiboly: ―The word amphiboly comes from the Greek “ampho‖, which means 
‗double‘ or ‗on both sides‘‖(Cline, 2018). Language may include sentence 
constructions that can be parsed in multiple ways to get different meanings. The word 
“amphiboly” refers to the syntactic ambiguity of a whole phrase or sentence which 
results to divergent interpretations. Headlines, for example, often provide such 
ambiguous phrases: “Squad Helps Dog Bite Victim”, “Miners Refuse to Work after 
Death”, “Deer Kill 17,000”.  
This fallacy is considered Propaganda when amphiboly is exploited on purpose to 
induce people to perceive the meaning in one (false) way, while responding to the 
accusation of lying by pointing to another (true) meaning (Marlin, 2002). 
                                                          
9
 https://www.txstate.edu/philosophy/resources/fallacy-definitions/Faulty-Analogy.html  
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Accident: The fallacy of accident was introduced by Aristotle. It occurs when a 
statement is applied as a general rule to all situations while ignoring legitimate 
exceptions. This sort of simplistic rules defies rationality and therefore, constitutes a 
logical fallacy. The ulterior motive behind this generalization is to ―bypass reason to 
preserve the illusion of a perfect law‖ (Bennett, 2012). Subsequently, this invalid 
syllogism can lead to absurd conclusions. For instance: 
Cutting people with knives is a crime. →Surgeons cut people with knives. →Surgeons 
are criminals. 
 
 
C. Propaganda: Non-Verbal Techniques 
 
In modern times, good policy-making is often followed by numbers. The problem lies 
in recognizing whether these numbers cited by experts are accurate and applied to 
determine policy or are untrustworthy and used to manipulate people‟s will. 
Among the various forms of propaganda in existence, the public also needs to be 
alarmed by the common pitfalls in the use of polls and statistics (Marlin, 2002).  
 
1. Opinion Polls 
 
―Public opinion polls, frequently conducted and with results that are widely 
disseminated, are one distinguishing feature of a healthy democracy‖ (Traugott, 2003). 
Western world is based on the premise that democracy is a superior system and, 
therefore, arguments for a given measure or policy gain ground if there is evidence that 
the proposals have the public‟s support (Marlin, 2002). Consequently, everyone who 
needs to take into account people‟s perspective turns to opinion polls, which are 
surveys designed to represent the viewpoints of a population. This kind of survey is 
usually employed by politicians, business leaders, as well as journalists, in order to 
measure opinion. Especially in politics, polling is used as a means of communication 
between the citizens and their elected representatives (Traugott, 2003). Under these 
conditions, opinion polls seem to be really important in today‟s world, since they 
constitute a tool through which people‟s wishes can be discerned (Dionne & Mann, 
2003). What is more, technological innovations have influenced survey methods, such 
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as the availability of the statistical software and Internet based polling, making it 
possible to produce data faster and cheaper. 
However, the ubiquity and wide use of pollsters arises many concerns about their 
reliability. People should be reluctant to trust the polling data, without a fair amount of 
detailed information about how the poll has been conducted (Traugott, 2003). Marlin 
notices that it is easy to be deceived by opinion polls and underlines that even those 
commissioning the polls can be misled. In his 2003 article “Can We Trust the Polls?:It 
all depends”, Traugott  strengthens Marlin‟s view. He urges poll consumers to be 
aware and notifies that “today, with polls proliferating in the media and with 
methodological concerns increasing within the polling industry, caution is even more 
warranted”. Indeed, opinion polls can be misleading in many ways. Some deceptions 
are connected with the polling methodology that may affect the quality and accuracy of 
the collected data. Others have an impact on people polled, by embedding certain ideas 
in their minds under the pretext of seeking their opinions. In particular, bogus polls of 
this sort are called “ruse polls” or “push polls” because they intend to push voters for 
or against a candidate (Marlin, 2002). According to reports, such a “push poll” was 
conducted, for instance, in 1996 by the Ontario government and was censured by the 
Ontario Secondary School Teachers Federation. The objective of the poll was to 
ascertain public opinion about the decision to make spending cuts in education up to 
$1billion. One of the polling questions was, “Since teachers have had it so good for so 
long, should they not be asked to suffer a little?” Teachers who had been polled 
complained to the federation and asked for the reconstruction of the question. The 
president of the OSSTF was quoted as referring to the government, “They are now 
engaging in a propaganda strategy to sway public opinion regarding the actions they 
intend to take in the education sector”10 (Marlin, 2002). 
Additionally, Randal Marlin outlines the “pseudo-polling”, regarding the polls seeking 
specific opinions on matters in order to reach a foregone conclusion. Especially some 
activist organizations are inclined to this method; instead of being interested in the 
responses, they try to encourage awareness and indignation concerning the problems 
noted by the question. 
 
In relation to the above, scholars made a thorough research and compiled a list of ways 
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 Ottawa Citizen, 10 February 1996: A14 
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in which polls can be deceptive and fallacious: 
Randomness: Polling is based on the theory that one gets a small sample from a 
population, and examines it, in order to form an idea about the whole composition of 
the specific population. Supposing the sample is absolutely random and respectively 
large (at least some hundreds for a population in the millions), there is a fair chance 
that the composition of the sample will give a quite clear view about the population as 
a whole. Randomness is obviously required in the polling procedure. It is a prerequisite 
that the selection of people to be sampled should not exclude particular groups, 
locations, or ages in order to be truly random and representative (Madden & Keri, 
2009). For instance, it would be misleading to ascertain the proportion of French 
speakers in the population of Canada by taking only a sample from Montreal, where 
there is a large percentage of French speakers (Marlin, 2002).  
Interviewer effects: There is evidence that biases can be produced resulting from who 
does the polling. Studies have indicated, for example, that African-Americans, when 
asked about racism, express themselves more freely to African-American interviewers 
than to white pollsters
11
. Moreover, the way pollsters manage the results plays a 
significant role. Randal Marlin notes specifically that ―how pollsters divide up the 
undecideds can make an important difference to the assessment of public opinion.‖ 
The author presents the case of the 1980 Quebec independence referendum. Back then, 
the director of research for the Canadian Broadcasting Federation (CBC), Barry Kiefl, 
commented on the opinion polls taken prior to referendum. His claim was that “some 
pollsters assume the undecided will split the same way as decided voters, others weight 
some of the undecided by the direction in which they are ‗leaning‘ or according to the 
party they voted for in an election. Some polls exclude those who indicate they are 
unlikely to vote, others include all eligible voters.”12 Kiefl underlined that the 
procedures followed by the pollsters could completely alter the results, particularly in a 
campaign during which there had been dramatic shifts in public opinion (Marlin, 
2002).  
Mathematical limitations: This factor refers to mathematically determinable ranges of 
error that arise during an opinion poll and are usually ignored in results-reports. It 
should be taken into consideration that every poll has a margin of error, which means 
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 See Herbert H. Hyman, et al. “Interviewing in Social Research‖, A Research Project of the National Opinion Research Center 
(Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1954) 159ff 
12
 Barry Kiefl, letter, Globe and Mail, 11 September 1984 
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that the real number is not necessarily the reported result, but is within a given range. 
Opinion polls include inevitably a margin of error due to the fact that researchers are 
polling a tiny sample of the voting public which cannot perfectly mirror the whole 
population (Alexander, 2017). Nevertheless, the larger the sample size, the smaller the 
margin of error. Pollsters should fulfill all the required conditions so that the result is 
as representative as possible, while, simultaneously, they should report the likely size 
of an error. 
The intricacies of polling are undoubtedly much more complicated. However, this 
approach helps us to comprehend the potential of deception (Marlin, 2002). For 
example, provided that a poll shows us that 36 per cent of Greeks prefer Alexis Tsipras 
as prime minister, and later, another poll shows us that 38 per cent favour him as prime 
minister, while the polls‟ stated range of error is plus or minus four percentage, we 
cannot presume that his popularity has increased
13
. In the first case, the estimate ranges 
from 32 to 40 per cent, and in the second one from 34 to 42 per cent. This fact creates 
the possibility that the real statistics of the opinion polls are respectively 40 per cent for 
the first one and 34 per cent for the second. Subsequently, a decline in the Prime 
Minister‟s popularity might have appeared as an increase (Marlin, 2002). 
Furthermore, in cases that subpopulations are considered, opinion polls seem to 
become even more untrustworthy. By giving another example regarding Quebec 
referendum, Randal Marlin tries to explain this observation. In 1990, a poll was 
conducted to 2,259 citizens coming from all areas of Canada (apart from the Northwest 
Territories and the Yukon) and he reported range of error was 2.2 percentage points. 
Supposing we make a reference to Quebec alone that is a province of Canada, its 
sample is smaller than the total one including it, so the relevant range of error becomes 
inevitably bigger. Indeed, it turned out by the pollsters that the respective ranges for 
each region were 4.3 percentage points for Quebec, 4.4 for Ontario, 4.8 for the Prairies, 
4.9 for British Columbia and 4.8 percentage points for Atlantic Canada
14 (Marlin, 
2002). 
Under these circumstances, pollsters and, by extension, media and newspapers should 
take into account these variables and inform the public appropriately. Otherwise, the 
people can be misled ―as to the true state of opinion‖ (Marlin, 2002). Usually, news 
reports of polling results include this necessary data; an estimated percentage with a 
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 the example was based on the author's example and adapted to Greek political realm 
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stated range of error and the number of people sampled. However, the confidence 
level
15 is often overlooked in news reports, and even if it appears, it is mentioned only 
superficially or in the fine print (Madden & Keri, 2009). 
Wording and Context of the Question: This probably constitutes the most remarkable 
way by which polls can influence public opinion. Randal Marlin explicates how the 
wording of the question can be biased in order to direct people‟s responses; the 
question “Are you in favor of nuclear power and the reduction of coal-fired, polluting, 
ecologically harmful power stations?” may evoke more positive answers regarding the 
nuclear industry, rather than the question “Do you favor nuclear power despite its high 
cost, the problems of nuclear waste disposal, and the remote possibility of meltdown?” 
(Marlin, 2002). The author underlines that reporters may irresponsibly ignore the full 
question while presenting the polling results and give emphasis only on the percentage 
of people being „for‟ or „against‟ nuclear power. He points out that readers should have 
the chance to consider how they would have responded in that case and for what 
reason. ―Journalistic integrity requires that the wording and the methodology be 
presented for the reader‘s inspection, even if only at the end of the story‖ (Marlin, 
2002). 
The way an opinion poll is constructed plays a significant role in the survey‟s outcome. 
More specifically, the structure of the questionnaire and how the questions are worded 
may – deliberately or not – lead the responders to answer in a particular way. For 
instance, asking “How inefficient is Prime Minister when it comes to foreign policy?” 
gives a negative connotation to the question, instead of asking “How would you 
describe Prime Minister‘s position on foreign policy?”16 Accordingly, a form of 
survey that could be proved misleading is when the pollster sets a pair of contrasting 
statements and asks people to indicate which one represents best their opinion. The 
following example explains how the context of the questions can elicit very different 
and incompatible answers: The Legal Research Institute at the University of Manitoba 
conducted a survey asking people to choose between “I must always obey the Law‖ / 
―It is alright to break the law as long as you don‘t get caught”. The respondents 
answered affirmatively by roughly 93 per cent to the first one and only 7 per cent 
chose the second. A few questions later though, the same people gave an affirmative 
response of about 47 per cent to the question “There are situations when it is right not 
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 In Mathematics: the probability that the value of a parameter falls within a specified range of values. 
16
 This is based on the example given in https://surveytown.com/10-examples-of-biased-survey-questions  
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to obey the law”, when it was contrasted with “Disobedience of the law can never be 
tolerated” (chosen approximately by 52 per cent). This inconsistency in responses 
demonstrates that the import of an answer to a poll question cannot be properly 
evaluated without knowing the question in context (Marlin, 2002). 
Dishonest Respondents: Undoubtedly, polls cannot be reliable if people give untruthful 
answers (Marlin, 2002). Lying is not easily detectable through the use polling and, 
therefore, constitutes a serious problem for pollsters. Respondents' honesty constitutes 
an important factor in polls and surveys, especially in the case of an election, in which 
the quality of the sampling is checked directly by the actual result (Reuben, 2014). 
Dishonesty in Gathering the Information: Some questionnaires are being answered 
only by marking with pencil a few coded blank spaces. Because of the fact that poll-
takers are sometimes paid with respect to the number of questionnaires completed, they 
can easily cheat and fill the sheets without taking interviews. Notwithstanding it is a 
risky method, checkups are not always such strong to guarantee integrity (Marlin, 
2002). Michael Wheeler gives an example in his book by presenting the case in 1968, 
when „New York Times‟ commissioned „Gallup‟ to conduct a survey regarding the 
attitudes of Harlem residents. Since the tabulated data were submitted to „New York 
Times‟ for publication, a pleased editor decided to get a story about some of the 
residents interviewed. However, the reporters sent could not find dwellings at seven of 
the twenty three addresses that had been given by Gallup. Apart from this, five more 
alleged respondents could not be traced, although their addresses existed. Following 
that, the „Times‟ newsman learned that even the rest of the interviews were not all 
legitimate, as in one occasion the poll-taker had discussed with four people playing 
cards and incorporated all their responses into one interview.
17
 Biased or Incompetent 
Interpretation of Answers: This factor refers to inaccurate conclusions based on polls. 
A failure to consider the polling theory and its methodological weaknesses is usually 
related to a deliberate attempt to mislead. Nevertheless, Randal Marlin emphasizes that 
―there may also be errors stemming, not from malevolence, but from wishful thinking 
or sheer ignorance‖. The author brings the example of a youth group in Canada, 
Katimavik
18
, which received public funding by the Liberal government. Its funds were 
cut off in 1984, when the Conservatives came to power; one of the reasons was that the 
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group was vilified in the press for taking drugs. However, one of them sent a letter to 
the „Ottawa Citizen‟ explaining that the interpretation of a poll regarding the use of 
drugs was biased. The writer outlined that one of the questions was “Are you aware of 
anyone having taken drugs during the period as participants of the program?” . Based 
on the answers, the report concluded that 55 per cent admitted to taking drugs. 
Subsequently, the sender of the letter pointed out that supposing the result was reliable, 
the conclusion should have been: “55 per cent of the participants are aware of the fact 
that a least one person has taken drugs”. 19 Accordingly, there are occasions when 
media favoring a certain person or policy promote polls supporting that position. They 
intentionally ignore methodological limitations of the specific poll or other polls 
presenting a contrary view (Marlin, 2002). 
Fluctuation of Opinion: Even if polls are properly executed, they present only the 
current public opinion at a given time. It is commonly observed that public attitude is 
affected by the news and the series of events.  Especially in politics, exit polls cannot 
predict or measure voters' change of view. Randal Marlin argues that politicians may 
count on favorable polls and, therefore, call for an election. However, this may create 
disappointment and a shift to voters' opinion particularly if the election is called earlier 
than supposed, so that the candidate takes advantage of the favorable opinion. ―This 
resentment can be aroused, fed, and exploited by opposition parties, as former Ontario 
Premier David Peterson found when he lost the election he called in 1990‖ (Marlin, 
2002). 
Deliberate Attempts to Manipulate Polls: Since prominent events seem to affect public 
opinion, people holding or seeking for power may manufacture such events (Marlin, 
2002). Such a case occurred when Charles Colson tried to improve President Richard 
Nixon‟s ranking in polls. According to author Wheeler, he made a profitable contract 
with a prominent pollster so that the last one exposes merely positive polls. Wheeler 
also reports that Nixon had a source inside the Gallup organization by the time of 1968 
campaign. This allowed him to be informed when surveys were going to be conducted 
and, consequently, arrange his activities in order to have the maximum impact on polls 
(Wheeler, 1976).  
Bogus (Unscientific) Polls: A legitimate poll is based on scientific sampling to 
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measure opinions and behaviors of a population. On the other hand, bogus polls 
include unscientific (and therefore, unreliable) methodology to determine public 
opinion, as well as other practices, similar to polls, designed for other purposes rather 
than legitimate research (Lavrakas, 2008).Various techniques are used to make 
unscientific assessments of opinion and produce "pseudo-polls". Paul Lavrakas argues 
that this sort of polls is problematic regarding its data quality. Bogus polls are usually 
conducted and publicized by media and other organizations ―with a serious intent to 
influence public opinion‖ (Marlin, 2002). 
 
2. Statistics 
According to Huff (1954), there are four identifiable figures of deception in the usage 
of statistics; the Well-Chosen Average, the Semi-Attached Figure, the ‗‘Gee Whiz‘‘ 
Graph and. the One-Dimensional Figure  
The Well-Chosen Average: The word “average” is primarily preferred by many experts 
or pollsters in order to misguide and influence the general public opinion since this 
term is deceptive by its own and has a very unclear and loose meaning.  Not many 
individuals know that there are actually three averages; the mean, the median and the 
mode. The mean is the sum of the quantities, divided by the numbers of quantities  that 
have been chosen; the median is the middle point of a data sample that separates the 
higher half of numbers from the lower half, when those numbers ranked in order and 
the mode is the most frequently appearing number in a data sample. Due to their 
similarity, inexperienced people are incapable of recognizing the differences and are 
led on false and unreliable conclusions. Thus, the “average” that is selected can alter 
the meaning of the data, as the “average” that is presented may differ significantly 
depending on whether the mean, the median or the mode is displayed (Huff, 1954). 
Therefore, pollsters, by using a different kind of average each time, can trick, deceive 
and manipulate people beliefs and perspectives by simply twisting the real facts 
according to their own benefits and purposes. In other words, an undefined “average” 
is meaningless, and for that reason it is essential to examine which kind of average 
someone is referring to. 
The Semi-Attached Figure: ‗‘If you can‘t prove what you want to prove, demonstrate 
something else and pretend that they are the same thing‖ (Huff, 1954). The semi-
attached figure is a useful tool that can be utilized in circumstances when the writer 
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aims to confuse people by presenting distorted data, in such a way that the real 
evidence is concealed and the public is deluded, taking advantage of that situation for 
their own benefits.  In particular, attaching two statistical data that seem to be identical, 
but they are actually irrelevant, and creating a comparison among them may lead to a 
valid statistical implication which is literally false, and produce, by extension, incorrect 
assumptions, misguidance and mistaken beliefs. It should be noted that this statistical 
collision confuses the human mind and it is impossible an inexperienced individual to 
notice the differences. Because of being undetectable, the semi-attached figure is 
clearly used as a strategy by experts who have the intention to deceive and misinform 
people, in order to accomplish a desirable objective (Huff, 1954, Marlin, 2013).  
The Gee Whiz Graph: The “Gee-Whiz” graph is a method frequently used. The 
majority of people does not prefer numbers and tries to avoid them with any cost, and 
when the words are inadequate to present a point of view, the writers apply another 
method for that purpose by creating pictures which are more accessible to the public. 
Moreover, the use of graphics and pictures with adjustable scales gives a highly chance 
to deform and alter the message.  The representation of the graphic-picture, in such a 
way that there seem to be small or no changes in relation to the original form, allows 
the readers to make their own assumptions, without any valid or reliable evidence, 
even though the final result may be totally ambiguous and unclear. According to Huff, 
there are numerous methods and techniques to manipulate and modify a graphic-
picture.  This device is commonly used by companies when the present digital data 
referring to their performance. More specifically, the basic trick of this 
misrepresentation is to deceive public‟s perception by selecting the most preferable 
poor data from the past and compare them with the most favorable data from the 
present, in order to enhance an organization‟s profile, eliminate antagonism and 
defame the competitors. Accordingly, that process can be reversed, depending on the 
current state of preference. In that case, the chosen data from the past will be good in 
comparison with the present data that will be poor, so that the propagandist may 
achieve the desirable outcome by minimizing the organization‟s errors and maximizing 
its accomplishments. However, if people become aware of that situation and begin to 
improve their knowledge about that matter, there is a great risk that this effort of 
deception fails entirely (Huff, 1954, Marlin, 2013). 
The one- dimensional figure: The one-dimensional figure is another strategy which 
may also be misleading by the increase or the decrease of a pictorial representation. 
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The one-dimensional figure usage is occurred when someone is using a figure-symbol 
instead of numbers, and this figure is not illustrated to the same and realistic scale with 
the initial numbers that have been provided.  This popular method misguides and 
misleads the public by changing the width, as well as the length of a preferred selected 
figure in comparison to another figure that is represented. The trick of the one-
dimensional figure may be deceptive as it gives an incorrect visual impression to the 
reader. As a result, this approach leads the individual to a false and an inaccurate 
conclusion about the statistical data of a given survey (Marlin, 2013). 
 
CHAPTER TWO: BRITAIN’S EU REFERENDUM 
 
A. Euroscepticim in Britain since 70’s 
 
The 2016 debate that led British people to the referendum and the decision on whether 
their country should leave or stay in the EU pivoted around issues which had been the 
main subject of previous intense debates, almost fifty years ago. In this extent, 2016 
referendum was not the first of its kind since almost the same questions had been asked 
forty years earlier (Davis, 2017).  According to Davis, the origins of Britain‟s detached 
attitude to the rest of Europe are traced back to the Roman Empire and Hundred Years‟ 
War, as well as to the Reformation and Henry VIII‟s break with Rome and the 
„Glorious Revolution‟. 
Great Britain‟s vision to adopt a constitutional monarchy set it against the absolutist 
regimes in the rest of the continent. It could be claimed that the notion of 
Euroscepticism derives from the very creation of Britain‟s state. The sense of 
difference and division from the „Other‟, such as the other neighbor and or the other 
rival patriotism, prevailed in English and hence British nationalism. Historically, for 
British people this „Other‟ has mainly been European (Davis, 2017). 
Wellings agrees that the fundamental development and verbalization of the anti-
European ideology, which sees „Europe‟ as the vital institution responsible for the 
English decline, originates from the past. Consequently, the principles of the modern 
English nationalism cannot be understood explicitly in political terms, but they can be 
explained through the understanding of the past. To this context, an analysis of the 
arguments used regarding the past in withstanding the European integration could shed 
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light to contemporary association between the English nationalism and Euroscepticism 
(Wellings, 2012). 
The foundations of the English nationalism‟s resurgence were set in two main ways by 
the debates on the accession in the European Economic Community (EEC) in the late 
60‟s and 70‟s.  Firstly, it was repeatedly argued that Britain should defend its 
Parliamentary sovereignty, whose continuity and significance could not really be 
understood by Continentals. And secondly, this kind of arguments led to the fusion of 
two notions, the Parliamentary sovereignty with the popular one, through the device of 
a referendum (Wellings, 2012). Yet, Wellings points out that other considerations also 
enhanced the skeptical position towards EU integration, many of which might simply 
rely on prejudice and unverified reports. As an example, the author cites a draft 
pamphlet by the businessman A.G.Elliot, who argues against entering the EEC on the 
following grounds: ―I visited France on a 2,000 mile business trip and everywhere 
(except among the peasants) I found half the companies and people I dealt with tried to 
cheat me.  As a recent television program proved this sort of thing does not happen to 
foreign visitors to England...  and while I have spoken about the French, people tell me 
Italians are worse‖ 20. Correspondingly, Great Britain‟s long-term bonds with the 
Empire and Commonwealth were a vital reason that generated the disinclination 
towards a closer economic and political integration with European countries. This 
became particularly obvious after the victory of Labour in 1974 general election, when 
Prime Minister Harold Wilson as the head of the government was inevitably 
committed to declare a referendum “on the re-negotiated terms  of  Britain‘s 
involvement in the EEC‖ (Wellings, 2012). Wilson‟s conviction was that Europe was 
directly related with threat and risk, while the Commonwealth offered support by 
holding family and friendly ties with Britain. Consequently, the possibility of Britain‟s 
accession in the EEC originated concerns and fears about potential costs for both sides, 
especially for New Zealand which would be the biggest loser of the Commonwealth 
members if that deal was agreed. Nevertheless, these great ties of partnership with 
Commonwealth were not such crucial for the development of English nationalism, as 
the importance of the protection of Parliamentary sovereignty. More specifically, 
during the upcoming referendum in 1975, the most enduring concern of the public and 
political class about the UK‟s entry in the EEC was linked to the authority and 
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governance.  The potential association with the powerful nations of Europe and the 
prospect of control being exercised over Britain brought great apprehension and the 
crowd‟s upheaval. As Wellings highlights, the last time British people faced these 
concerns was during World War II, when some of these nations fought against Britain. 
As a result, United Kingdom‟s fears of losing its autonomy and supremacy as a nation 
were dominant. 
Notably, since this point, Labour Party was the only side largely opposed to European 
integration, as the Conservatives and the Liberals used to support a deal with the 
European Economic Community. According to Wellings, the left-wing regarded the 
EEC as a “pro-big business”, however their objections were also based on the matters 
of sovereignty and history. To this extend, Ron Leighton
21
 argued that ―Sovereignty is 
not a reactionary concept.  It is our most precious possession, as those countries in the 
world without it today would testify‖ (Leighton, 1971).  He continued by stating, “Our 
present liberties and freedoms in Britain were fought for and achieved by our 
forefathers in a long struggle (...).  Our present MPs have inherited these rights and 
liberties, and now they are custodians responsible for handing them on to future 
generations.  They certainly have no mandate to surrender or abandon our right to 
self-government and self-determination to the apparatus in Brussels and would never 
be forgiven for doing so” (Leighton, 1971). Apart from this, it should be noted that 
many of their arguments derived also from a skeptical attitude towards the EEC‟s 
framework, since it was merely seen as a capitalist and Christian Democratic structure. 
Viewing the events in chronological order, after the Treaty of Rome was signed by PM 
Ted Health in 1972 and Britain entered into the EEC, a specific political group gave 
prominence to the issue of the referendum. That group was called the „Anti-
Marketeers‟ and was mainly – but not entirely – comprised by members of the Labour 
Party. Labour came to power, after winning both elections in 1974, by advocating the 
importance of Britain‟s autonomy and the requirement of a referendum regarding the 
―continued UK involvement under renegotiated terms of accession‖ (Wellings, 2012). 
Due to this public declaration, it was decided that a referendum would be held on the 
6
th
 of June 1975. 
Despite the fact that the „Anti-Marketeers‟ were the first ones to fuse the Parliamentary 
and popular sovereignty, Enoch Powell – the ex-Conservative MP – was the one that 
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clearly associated national identity with sovereignty. During the referendum campaign, 
Powell outlined that “parliamentary sovereignty is the form in which we are 
accustomed to asserting our national independence”, adding that Parliamentary 
sovereignty was also “the fact for which men have fought and died, that the laws in 
their country are made only by the institutions of their country and in Britain that they 
are made only by the parliamentary institutions of our country” (Powell, 1975). In the 
run-up to the referendum, these debates demonstrated that the British identity was 
founded upon and expressed with respect to the uniqueness of Parliament.  According 
to their perspective, the UK‟s legislature was particularly important, and distinct from 
other institutions, due to its historical foundation and its endurance and continuity 
throughout the 20
th
 century. It was highly thought that the Continental Europeans were 
not able to understand this notion because, as the anti-Market National Referendum 
Campaign argued, they were “more used to giving up their institutions” than British 
people (National Referendum Campaign, 1975, Wellings, 2012).  
Consequently, the core and comprehension of England‟s past became a populist issue 
and the main topic of the referendum in 1975. Apparently, through this innovative 
device people could vote and decide upon this significant matter. 
 Nevertheless, the whole referendum procedure ―was also designed to preserve the 
Labour Party from splitting over the issue of Europe‖ (Hennessy, 2001). Labour Party 
took advantage of that situation and tried to resolve the protracted disputes over 
Europe‟s integration by inducing the electorate to make the final decision. Ultimately, 
the „Anti-Marketeers‟ argued to the public that the referendum was related to “whether 
or not we remain free to rule ourselves in our own way” (National Referendum 
Campaign, 1975), while the government‟s campaign backing a „Yes‟ vote stressed out 
material interests by downplaying the threat to sovereignty:  ―Today we are even more 
dependent on what happens outside.  Our trade, our jobs, our food, our defence cannot 
wholly be within our own control.  That is why so much of the argument about 
sovereignty is a false one (…) If we came out, the Community would go on taking 
decisions which affect us vitally – but we should have no say in them” (Britain in 
Europe, 1975). Remarkably, British people were more persuaded by the arguments 
referring to vital material benefits, as the memories of the wartime still remained vivid: 
“Britain, as a country which cannot feed itself, will be safer in the Community which is 
almost self-sufficient in food” (Britain in Europe, 1975). Nonetheless, these debating 
points contributed significantly to the emergence of a national identity connected with 
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Parliamentary sovereignty by giving a political character to these feelings.  
As far as the Conservative Party is concerned, it was observed that their commitment 
to European integration had been diminishing through the time. According to Andrew 
Geddes, Conservative‟s pro-European views were based on a “rather narrow trade-
based idea of European integration‖ which could not be adapted to the new 
challenging plans for political and economic integration introduced in the 1980‟s 
(Geddes, 2004).  Indeed, Margaret Thatcher, who campaigned for a positive vote in 
1975, sought to adjust the European Community‟s regulation to the Britain‟s standards 
when she became a Prime Minister. Her initial negotiations with the European 
counterparts were solely related to the budget rebate, but later her uncompromising 
policies and aggressive rhetoric concerning the European integrative measures revealed 
her intentions (Wellings, 2012, Bismarck, 2016). Undoubtedly, after the Single 
European Act (SEA) in 1987, the Conservative Party seemed to make tremendous 
attempts to reform and improve the European Community according to Great Britain‟s 
recent liberal profile. However, the roots of the „‟Euroscepticism‟‟ phenomenon can be 
basically traced in Thatcher‟s efforts to modify the Conservative Party and Britain 
itself since 1975. More specifically, Thatcher‟s viewpoints regarding British 
sovereignty created divisions within the Conservative Party, as well as, within the 
United Kingdom itself (Wellings, 2012). In particular, the idea that “government 
should step in and replace organic and spontaneous relationships by regimentation 
from above‖ claimed Thatcher, ―is alien to the Anglo-Saxon tradition‖ (Thatcher, 
1977). 
Similarly to what occurred during Labour‟s referendum in 1975, internal concerns 
emerged once again about Britain‟s autonomy and the processing European 
integration, by creating eventually significant unfavorable attitudes towards the EEC. 
This negative stance also initiated a „battle of ideas‟ and intense arguments on the 
relationship between the individual and the state in Britain (Wellings, 2012). Since 
1979, the Conservative Party worked to transform Thatcherite principles into political 
and social reality.  
Margaret Thatcher‟s philosophy concerning the „individualistic anti-bureaucratism‟ 
was officially made public in her Bruges Speech in 1988.Thatcher referred extensively 
to the future of the European Community and, with this speech, she aimed to stop this 
'foreign power' of deteriorating the national and individual liberty. Her most trenchant 
argument was that ―We have not successfully rolled back the frontiers of the state in 
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Britain, only to see them re-imposed at a European level‖ (Thatcher, 1988, Bismarck, 
2016).  Subsequently, her viewpoints regarding the political, economic and social 
growth of European Community disclosed Britain's sense of superiority, especially 
with respect to government's system – ―if I were an Italian, I might prefer rule from 
Brussels too‖ (Thatcher, 1995). In addition, her statements revealed the close relation 
of British way of life with the institutional character of the state and the wide concern 
that this relation may be affected by the European integration: ―British democracy, 
parliamentary sovereignty, the common law, our traditional sense of fairness, our 
ability to run our own affairs in our own way‖ might be ―subordinated to a remote 
European bureaucracy, resting on very different traditions‖ (Thatcher, 1995, 
Wellings, 2012). 
A combination of Euroscepticism and xenophobia also emerged due to additional 
developments and changes within the EEC in late 80s, especially the German re-
unification. Margaret Thatcher‟s initiatives for meetings and discussions about German 
national identity – namely at Chequers in March 1990 -  as well as the fact that 
Nicholas Ridley characterized the EC as „German racket‟ demonstrated suspicions 
originated from the recent war-experience with Germany a few decades before 
(Ramsden, 2006). According to Thatcher views, Germany since 1871 had been 
changing directions ―unpredictably between aggression and self-doubt‖, therefore 
including post-War Germany within the European Unity would succeed only 
worsening and not solving „the German problem‟ (Thatcher, 1995). To this extent, for 
Thatcher, a re-unified Germany inside a powerful EC constituted the worst scenario 
(Volkery, 2009). Remarkably, although Thatcher was initially isolated in her concerns, 
Conservative Party's inclination to think the EC as a threatening alliance of former 
enemies started to strengthen. In line with the above, the press reported in great extent 
the Single Market's regulation and its impact on the United Kingdom, implying the 
existence of European threat with respect to Parliament‟s sovereignty, and 
consequently the core of popular life.  
In 1990, during the battle for Conservative‟s leadership, the issue of Europe amplified 
the divisions within the party. Despite the various efforts of the pro-European wing in 
the Conservative Party to amend the anti-European feelings, a sense of Euroscepticism 
had overrun the party. This suggested that John Major, the new Prime Minister, had to 
deal with those Eurosceptic sentiments, when at the same time there were negotiations 
in Maastricht about the political project of European Union (Wellings, 2012). Once 
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again, debates on EU structure and integration were based on the wartime and the 
threat that Britain faced by Nazi Germany and its allies. For example, in line with this, 
The Spectator published a Paul Johnson‟s paper declaring that ―what the row over the 
Maastricht Treaty has brought to the surface is the salient fact that Britain‘s real 
enemy is not Germany but France (…) where hatred of Britain and the individual 
freedom it stands for is a religion‖ (Johnson, 1992). 
Correspondingly, Conservative Eurosceptics expressed their concerns about the 
corrosion of democracy resulting from being an underrepresented and not really 
understood part of a centralized political union (Wellings, 2012). This indicated the 
fact that European integration was gradually raising a sense of discrimination regarding 
the issue of sovereignty. Even worse, it was believed that the European Union intended 
to impose on the United Kingdom specific political rights and freedoms, opposed to 
Britain‟s conception. Based on this, Bill Cash and Iain Duncan Smith - leading 
Eurosceptics - blamed the Chancellor of Germany, Helmut Kohl, for promoting ―a 
system of authoritarian and bureaucratic European government which would 
extinguish the opportunity to disagree‖ (Cash and Duncan Smith, 1996). Furthermore, 
they both argued by stressing the 'German Problem' that the intense interference of 
Germany in the balanced function of EU might ―destabilize Europe and the world well 
into the next millennium‖ (Cash and Duncan Smith, 1996). 
The mentality of viewing Anglo-European relations in respect of the past had become 
by 1996 so deep-rooted that momentous Anglo-European interplays were described as 
conflicts. The late 80s and 90s debates regarding the European integration deepened 
the connection made "between the nation, the past and the defence of sovereignty" 
(Wellings, 2012).  What is more, the added element of English individualism to the 
above allowed the increased criticisms of the EU for constraining, and not insuring, 
liberty. 
In 1997, New Labour Party came to power and one of their first and most notable 
actions was to delegate power to Scotland, Wales, London and Northern Ireland. 
Remarkably, during the 1990s, a kind of English nationalism started to be produced 
because of this uneven devolved structure of Britain. This type of nationalism, 
according to Philip Resnick, is characterized by „hubris‟ – excessive pride and 
arrogance – and is usually traced in national majorities of former imperial states. In 
contrast, he claims that the feeling which characterizes the national minorities is 
„melancholy‟ (Resnick, 2008). In England, this supposed English nationalism was 
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based on Eurosceptic ideas, or at least the philosophy of Euroscepticism could embrace 
opinions about „national decline‟ – resulting particularly from open borders, the 
bureaucratic EU regulation and foreign corrosion of the United Kingdom‟s 
sovereignty. A combination of Resnick‟s two descriptions – „hubristically 
melancholic‟ – could properly define that English nationalism in the beginning of 21st 
century, when ―a nostalgia for the past (was) combined with an increasingly organized 
and popular anti-European politics‖ (Wellings, 2012). 
It is also worth noting that, initially the general elections in 1997 caused a further 
separation between the two major parties on the issue of Europe.  At the beginning, the 
difference between the Conservatives and New Labour was profound. After the long 
period of Conservative Euroscepticism, New Labour seemed to bring some 'fresh air' 
in the political area. During its 1980's and 1990's 'modernization', Labour Party 
abandoned its 1983 manifesto commitment to withdraw from the EEC. Notably, 
Antony Blair was the most pro-European Prime Minister since Heath (Gamble, 2003). 
With respect to the relations with European partners, at first they appeared to be utterly 
friendly. However, this goodwill aimed to Britain's commitment for cooperation 
"within the framework of European multilateralism", as proved by the constructive 
attitude of the new British government when the Treaty of Amsterdam (1997) was 
signed and the St Mâlo Agreement (1998) between Britain and France was concluded. 
Nevertheless, Blair was also aware of the „‟special relationship‟‟ between Great Britain 
and United States of America and after September of 2001, he demonstrated an 
inclination towards a closer Atlanticist cooperation that seemed to justify all of General 
De Gaulle‟s worries and doubts about Britain‟s engagement in Europe. In addition, 
alongside with the pro-American attitude, Britain‟s refusal to entrust and accept the 
euro currency, created a strong belief that UK was reluctant –or incapable- to decide 
between America and Europe (Wellings, 2012).  
Moreover, it was the contradictory reactions of the foreign ministries of Europe to the 
invasion of Iraq led by the US, which costed Brair by damaging his European 
reputation. More specifically, his decision to back the US brought United Kingdom 
back into the „awkward‟ camp regarding the European matters. The primary invasion 
against Iraq, in 2003, turned American, British and Australian armed forces against 
some European countries, such as Germany, Belgium and France, who supported Iraq. 
However, the Anglophone countries had assistance from Spain, Italy and Denmark. 
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That diplomatic argument led US Secretary of State Donald Rumsfeld to separate 
Europe into „old‟ and „new‟, with Britain belonging to the second one.  According to 
Wellings, this division could also be regarded as „core‟ and „no-core‟ Europe, with 
Britain being part of the „noncore‟ group (Wellings, 2012). 
As it has been indicated by opinion polls back in 1975, the majority of people did not 
vote UK to stay in the EEC because they strongly supported Britain‟s continuing 
engagement in the European Community. On the contrary, their decision was based on 
the fact that they had no other available option (Boase Massimi Pollitt Partnership, 
1975). Tom Naim argues that the loss of ―greatness‖ – a term used to describe 
Britain‟s desire to project its power to the rest of the world – created much 
Euroscepticism (Naim, 2002, Wellings, 2012). As mentioned above, public‟s concerns 
about the way Britain‟s power and freedom of action were restricted within an enlarged 
EU were gradually increasing. Apparently, the European Union symbolized the 
Britain‟s decline and, to this extend, it could be accused for everything that might go 
wrong within the state; from unregulated immigration to bureaucratic waste. 
It was these exact convictions on which the United Kingdom Independence Party 
(UKIP) was based in order to be formed. UKIP members articulated the party‟s “Five 
Freedoms”, including the first principle which was freedom from the EU (UKIP, 
2004). The United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP), which was established in 
1993, had as primary goal to ensure that Britain will withdraw from the European 
Union in order to protect and maintain its sovereignty. Notably, there are two 
significant arguments of UKIP political party regarding their manifest, which are worth 
mentioning. Firstly, they strongly believed that if Britain left the EU, it would become 
once again ―a normal self –governing democracy‖ (UKIP, 1997), and secondly that 
the European Union would increasingly force Britain “to abandon the centuries old 
democratic and legal systems that have been embraced by countries throughout the 
world”(UKIP, 2004). Notwithstanding that party‟s name and policies indicated that 
this was a British party, in fact UKIP‟s campaign strategies and electoral successes – 
especially in the 2004 European elections – lead to a different assessment. UKIP 
focused its efforts to be elected particularly in England, where it achieved eventually to 
win all of its twelve seats. Likewise, in the same elections, Conservative‟s twenty-four 
seats – out of their twenty-seven won – were gathered in England. Although, it would 
be inaccurate to claim that Eurosceptic attitudes are only observed in England, it can be 
argued that Euroscepticism is ―a bigger vote winner‖ in England in comparison to the 
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other parts of the United Kingdom (Wellings, 2012). Furthermore, it is interesting that 
a possible comparison between the de facto English nationalist party and the Scottish 
National Party would reveal significant differences. The latter did not consider 
European integration to be a threat, like the English nationalists. Instead, European 
integration was viewed as an opportunity that offered guarantee and augmentation to 
Scottish sovereignty (Ichijo, 2004). This suggests that the meaning of defending 
sovereignty could be perceived in different ways. Indeed, in the following 2009 
European elections, the British National Party (BNP) also secured two seats in 
England, by advocating the issues of anti-Europeanism and anti-immigration in terms 
of maintaining sovereignty. 
In conclusion, the association between Euroscepticism and English nationalism is 
highly important for many reasons. First of all, the debates regarding the Britain‟s 
accession to the EEC and its continuous level of engagement in the European 
integration process concentrate on the role of sovereignty – especially the 
Parliamentary one – as a pivotal aspect in English nationalism. Secondly, the internal 
policies, notions and norms about Parliamentary sovereignty have acquired a popular 
dimension through the referenda promoted by Eurosceptics. This inevitably led to the 
fusion between Parliamentary and popular sovereignty. It should be also noted that 
even though Euroscepticism may find supporters all over the United Kingdom, the 
different policies and strategies of nationalist parties towards the EU signify that 
Eurospepticism is more popular in England. Last but not least, the views and 
understandings of the past and the protection of Parliament‟s sovereignty bolster and 
reinforce each other. The conclusion is that Euroscepticism may basically be a sort of 
English nationalism, yet this English nationalism expresses typically the Britishness 
(Wellings, 2012).  
 
B. Brexit vs. Bremain: Methods, Techniques and Rhetoric 
 
The United Kingdom faced a referendum wherein Britons had to decide whether 
Britain would remain in or leave the European Union (EU). Referendum or plebiscite 
is called the procedure in which every person of voting age can participate, providing a 
yes or no answer to a legislative or policy query, directing democracy in action with 
their vote preference.  The side which gets the majority of more than half of all votes 
wins. The Brexit referendum was held on 23
rd
 of June 2016. Noteworthy, PM David 
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Cameron had promised to the public that if he won the 2015 general election, a 
plebiscite would be held, arguing that it was time to settle the European question in 
British politics. Moreover, Cameron was responding to the requests of his own 
Conservative Members of Parliament (MPs) and the UK Independence Party (UKIP), 
who demonstrated that British people had not given the opportunity to express their 
views about Britain‟s European membership since 1975. They also claimed that the EU 
was progressively exercising more control over the daily lives of British citizens. 
David Cameron had also decided to negotiate an agreement with other EU leaders to 
alter the terms of Britain‟s EU membership before the official announcement of the 
referendum (Bartlett, 2016). 
The official campaign group for staying in the EU was known as ‗Britain Stronger In 
Europe‘ – or informally „Remain‟. It was chaired by Stuart Rose and endorsed by the 
Chancellor George Osborne and the Prime Minister David Cameron. There were also 
additional campaigns supporting remaining in the EU, including ‗Conservatives In‘, 
‗Labour In for Britain‘, ‗Greens for a Better Europe‘, ‗#INtogether (Liberal 
Democrats)‘, ‗Scientists for EU‘, ‗Universities for Europe‘, ‗Environmentalists for 
Europe‘ and ‗Another Europe is Possible‘. On the other hand, the official campaign 
supporting Brexit was ‗Vote Leave‘, after a contest for the designation with 
‗Leave.EU‘. It was fronted by the Secretary of Justice Michael Gove, the Conservative 
MP Boris Johnson and Labour MP Gisela Stuart. Each side found support from across 
the political spectrum, as well as from businesses, newspapers, trade unions and 
prominent individuals. Both of the official campaigns deployed a variety of methods 
and techniques in order to manipulate and shape public‟s opinion. This section 
examines the strategy of the two opposing sides that led to the outcome of the Britain‟s 
EU referendum in 2016.  
 
1. Membership, Designation and Campaigns’ Strategy 
 
1.a. ‘Leave’ Campaign 
 
One of the most significant personalities that played a vital role in the Out campaign‟s 
preparation was Dominic Cummings. Due to his previous success as a campaign 
director at Business for Sterling, which assisted to retain Britain out of the euro, he was 
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considered as one of the most intelligent and capable professional of his generation on 
public policy. The political strategist and lobbyist of Out campaign, Matthew Elliott, 
selected Cummings because of his strongly Eurosceptic views, his organizational skills 
and his determination to run a successful campaign. Already since 2014 Elliott had 
hired Cummings in order to conduct polls and create focus groups regarding how an 
Out campaign might be formed. This study was highly essential because it proved that 
the public views differentiated from London elite‟s concerns, leading him to realize 
that this was the key factor of winning the referendum. More specifically, Cummings 
concluded that Europe was totally unpopular and identified that people did not like the 
foreigners, abominated the bankers and thought more money should be spent to NHS 
(Shipman, 2017). Furthermore, he had correctly foreseen that immigration and control 
issues would affect people‟s position in the possibility of a referendum. He outlined his 
views in an article, stating that ―the combination of immigration, benefits, and human 
rights dominates all discussion of politics and Europe. People think that immigration 
is ‗out of control‘ [and] puts public services under intolerable strain‖ 22.  In the case 
of a referendum, the main dilemma in public‟s choice would be related to the risk of an 
economic disaster, or, the amount of money that could be saved by controlling 
immigration. However, he realized that it was preferable to neutralize the issue of 
immigration instead of focus on it – and give more attention on other arguments to 
convince the electorate during the official OUT campaign. Cumming‟s decision was 
also based on the fact that Farage and Ukip party would inevitably refer to the 
immigration, so he preferred to give emphasis on other crucial aspects to get a hearing 
from the media.    
Furthermore, during the formation of the campaign‟s strategy, Cummings cooperated 
with Paul Stephenson, who was British Bankers Association‟s communication director 
and former special adviser at Transport Department and the Department Health. 
Remarkably, he was also one of the most skillful and efficient media operators of 
Conservative Party and highly appreciated by journalists. As a passionate Eurosceptic 
he had involved on a variety anti-Brussels campaigns. Stephenson agreed with 
Cummings to highlight the immigration issue close to the polling day and only after 
they had won the designation. By following that policy, they achieved not to be 
associated with Farage‟s party and be characterized as racists by the electorate. 
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In accordance with the above, Cummings posted extended reports in his blog, referring 
to Europe being detrimental for democracy based on scientific endeavors and 
descriptions on how the civil service was operating (Shipman, 2017). It could be 
indicated that this was his first effort to apply Propaganda, since his claims included 
specific persuasive techniques. More specifically, experts‟ affirmation could be 
considered as „appeal to authority‟, while he „pinpointed as enemy‟ the European 
Union and referred to democracy by making use of the „glittering generality‟ device. It 
is also worth mentioning that one of Cummings priorities, when he started to form the 
campaign team, was to approach and integrate Business for Britain as a Brexit outfit.  
On the other hand, Farage was convinced that Mathew Elliott and Business for Britain 
would not eventually commit for Brexit and took the initiative to launch an alternative 
Brexit campaign with his own team. He strongly believed that forming an organization 
as soon as possible would provide Brexit camp valuable time to prepare efficiently 
against Remainers. Farage and Chris Bruni-Lowe, the campaign expert of Ukip party, 
proposed Arron Banks to set up this operation.  
Arron Banks, a successful businessman and former donator of Tory Party, became 
known in political background in 2014, when he changed sides and started supporting 
the Ukip. After the general elections, he offered £1 million to the party, but Farage and 
Bruni-Lowe suggested him instead, to found and invest in a referendum campaign. As 
a result, on 21
st
 of June, Banks declared officially on Sunday Telegraph paper that he 
intended to fund £20 million for creating a leave campaign called „No thanks we are 
going global‟. Banks‟ first notable action was to hire Gerry Gunster, a political 
consultant in the US, known for his great achievement of winning more than thirty 
referendums across the world. 
By the time the second „No‟ campaign had been organized, the first one had not even 
been set up. However, Cummings‟ team got motivated in June, after Cameron outlined 
briefly his requirements at the European Council in Brussels. It was observed that 
many parts of the Bloomberg‟s speech were missing, as well as some of the 
commitments that Cameron had publicly made. Taking advance of that incident, 
Cummings seized the opportunity to present Cameron as unreliable and by using this 
„ad hominem argument‟ to urge the donors to shift direction and support the „Out‟ 
campaign. Moreover, just before Cameron‟s summit press conference, the Guardian 
published an article exposing Cameron‟s intention to rely his referendum campaign 
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mainly on  the risks of Brexit –  following the same tactic he had deployed in the 
Scottish referendum, known as „‟Project Fear‟‟. 23 The story was based on a leaked 
report, whose source was suspected to be the Italian embassy, which described a 
private conversation among the prime minister and a fellow EU leader. Elliott‟s spin 
doctor, Rob Oxley revealed the story to the MPs, especially to those being Eurosceptic. 
Additionally, Elliot convinced „Business for Britain‟ to join the „Out‟ camp by the end 
of July, who were determined since then to anticipate until Cameron‟s renegotiation, in 
order to promote their expectations on the final deal.   
Additionally, one more noteworthy initiative that Cummings took to convince the 
undecided public was to introduce the possibility of a second referendum after voting 
for out, in which they could decide upon a new and more profitable deal with EU. 
More specifically he claimed at his blog that, ―If you want to say ―Stop‖, vote no and 
you will get another chance to vote on the new deal‖, drawing instantly the media‟s 
attention. Notably, London mayor Boris Johnson was excited about the double-
referendum idea and he publicly approved it at the end of June, explaining that it 
would prove to Brussels that Britain was determined for an EU reform.
24
  
Incidents of high importance occurred in September, starting with the creation of 
„ExCom‟ – an exploratory committee set up by Bernard Jenkin in order to convene 
more MPs – that would constitute the Leave campaign‟s voice within the Parliament. 
Following that, the two official sides, which were committed to Brexit, decided to 
rename their campaigns in accordance with Electoral Commission‟s final decision to 
change the wording of the referendum question so that people could choose between 
Remain/Leave instead of Yes/No. The name of Banks‟ campaign was modified from 
“the KNOW” to “Leave EU” while Elliot changed his campaign‟s logo from a simple 
„NO‟ to „Vote Leave‟ because it implicated an action. Eventually, Elliott along with 
Cummings concluded that the complete name of the slogan would be “Vote Leave. 
Take Control”, based on Cummings‟ ascertainment that “Let‟s Take Back Control” is a 
strong argument within focus groups (Shipman, 2017). 
Cummings decided to announce the beginning of his campaign operation by uploading 
a video on social media instead of holding a press conference. His decision was based 
on the fact that he did not have yet enough economic and political support. The posted 
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video described that, “Every week, the United Kingdom sends £350 million of 
taxpayers‘ money to the EU. That‘s the cost of a fully staffed, brand-new hospital, or 
looked at another way, that‘s £20 billion per year‖ and continued by quoting ‗Vote 
Leave, let‘s take back control‘ (Shipman, 2017). Apparently, this was an attempt to 
influence public‟s opinion by employing „appeal to emotion‟ and evoke compassion 
regarding the possible establishment of a hospital and enhance the outrage for the 
money spent on the EU. 
Furthermore, besides their internal war, „Vote Leave‟ and „Leave.EU‟ had significant 
differences regarding their strategy and the way they approached the voters. The 
Electoral Commision had to designate only one outfit to represent and run officially the 
Leave campaign. Vote Leave‟s insight was to be a cross-party campaign, yet without 
any links to the Ukip, more based on the economics than immigration and target swing 
voters, particularly the centre ones. On the other hand, Leave.EU team managed to take 
advantage of Bank‟s financial and business background and mobilize his Bristol call 
centers to persuade people to vote for Brexit. They also created an impressive and 
challenging social media operation and targeted mainly Labour voters, people on the 
right of the Conservative Party and those who had never voted before (Shipman, 2017). 
In contrast with Vote Leave, the assumption of Leave.EU was that the centre voters 
would back Remain. Moreover, Bank‟s vision was to run a Trump-style campaign by 
employing Trump‟s strategy of deliberately making an outrageous claim to “create as 
much noise as possible‖ (Shipman, 2017).  The campaign‟s strategist, Wigmore, would 
highlight later such comments made by Banks or Farage on social media. He admitted 
in an interview that ―If people are outraged, you can do one of two things. You can 
ignore it and then it dies, or you can react and take it down, not apologize, but then see 
what the reaction is. When you take it down it‘s like an admission of guilt, so you get 
the double hit with the press. Then you put it back up and get the treble hit(…). In some 
cases, within an hour, we would change a headline on Facebook or Twitter maybe five 
or six times, just to gauge the reaction. We were monitoring how many people looked 
and shared it, where it went, and reacted accordingly‖ (Shipman, 2017). 
With respect to „Vote Leave‟s strategy, there were specific instructions inside the 
campaign on how to disrupt and disorientate the opponents. Cummings provided 
guidance to his colleagues and advised them to get in the enemy‟s „OODA loop‟. The 
term „OODA loop‟ comes from the American military strategy and stands for „observe, 
orient, decide, and act‟ (Boyed, 1995, Shipman, 2017). Based on this strategy, he urged 
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his team to take actions more quickly than the adversaries in order to operate in an 
unpredictable way and generate disorder and confusion to the opponents. Cummings 
had studied Thucydides, Clausewitz, Mao and other authors, philosophers and military 
leaders and was determined to run the Leave campaign following basic principles of 
psychological warfare. Due to his acquaintance with many people from the Downing 
Street and Remain campaign, he was also able to exploit the weak points of his 
enemies (Shipman, 2017). Subsequently, the head of strategy implemented two further 
plans in order to get publicity. First of all, despite the warnings of Health secretary 
team, he displayed the NHS logo on „Vote Leave‟s leaflets and on the side of the 
campaign‟s bus. The second plan was related to Cummings‟ endeavour to neutralize 
the most influential business voice in United Kingdom, the Confederation of British 
Industry (CBI). In November, the campaign team organized a protest at the CBI‟s 
annual conference and gained access to the event by creating a fake company. When 
Cameron prepared to make his speech, they raised placards writing „CBI=Voice of 
Brussels‟. Additionally, a month later „Vote Leave‟ made its first overt „ad hominem 
attack‟ to Cameron, when the newspapers published that the PM might lead the Brexit 
campaign in case his renegotiation with Brussels was unsuccessful. More specifically, 
the chiefs of „Vote Leave‟ replied to newspaper journalists and referred to Cameron as 
‗toxic‘ on the issue of Leave campaign (Shipman, 2017). 
In the designation battle between „Leave.EU‟ and „Vote Leave‟, a third outfit was 
added in December 2015, called the „Grassroots Out‟ (GO) and was set up by 
Conservatives MPs, Peter Bone and Tom Purgslove. The aim of this organization was 
to argue for Brexit through small-scale campaign events in village halls, town squares 
and street stalls. Subsequently, GO and Leave.EU resolved to cooperate and they 
organized a series of big rallies which proved really successful and popular (Shipman, 
2017). The new campaign group was called „GO Movement Ltd‟. 
Eventually in April, the Electoral Commission declared that Vote Leave would be the 
official „Out‟ campaign and immediately after their victory, Cummings and his team 
unveiled a new poster in order to launch the formal campaign. It could be asserted that 
this poster was part of their propaganda strategy as it promised for the first time to 
spend on the National Health System (NHS) the entire £350 million amount of 
Britain‟s weekly contribution to the EU. 
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1.b. ‘Remain’ Campaign 
 
One of the most distinguished figures that is worth to be mentioned regarding the 
operation of „In‟ campaign is Andrew Cooper. His professional background as a 
pollster and his significant role in „Better Together‟, the cross-party campaign that won 
the Scottish Independence referendum, led to his recruitment. 
Prior to Cameron‟s official announcement to hold an EU referendum, Cooper‟s 
company „Populus‟ was hired in order to conduct opinion polls and make a 
„segmentation analysis‟ dividing up the public into different groups of voters with 
respect to their attitudes towards Europe. As a result, he identified seven discrete 
groups, to which gave names and constructed their profile by depicting a typical 
member. The first two groups were called „Ardent Internationalists‟ and „Comfortable 
Europhiles‟ and were expected to vote to remain. Cooper also estimated that they 
accounted for 29 per cent of the population. „Engaged Metropolitans‟ constituted a 
third smaller group, very active on social media, which was also likely to vote to stay. 
On the contrary, he found two groups, called „Strong Sceptics‟ and „EU hostiles‟, that 
were determined to support „Brexit‟. „Strong Sceptics‟ were mainly white people, 
probably over fifty-five years old and with only a secondary education. They were 
generally Labour supporters with some obvious Ukip tendencies, accounting for 21 per 
cent of the population. „EU Hostiles‟ were mainly retired people and Ukip voters, 
making up an 11 per cent and being informed of the news by the Daily Mail. However, 
Cooper's target would be the two following categories. The „Disengaged Middle‟, who 
were at the age of thirties, well-educated, from middle-class and got informed from 
Facebook. According to Cooper, they were not interested in politics and knew little 
about European Union since they thought it had a rather small impact on their lives. 
The final and most important group “encapsulated the rhetorical challenge the 
campaign faced‖ (Shipman, 2017). They were called „Hearts v Heads‟ and were two-
thirds women, probably middle-aged, married or divorced with children and worked 
mainly part-time or in a low-paid job. They usually read newspapers and were 
concerned about the issue of Europe, which, however, regarded as a complex one and 
felt muddled and confused. The majority of them agreed with the statement ―My heart 
says we should leave the EU, but my head says it‘s not a good idea‖. Subsequently, 
Cooper urged the importance of focusing mostly on those last groups upon his 
campaign team (Shipman, 2017). 
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Apart from Andrew Cooper, other driving forces constituted Will Straw, who was 
hired to run the operation and David Chaplin as media operator of the Remain 
campaign. Regarding the name of the campaign, they devised the emblematic red, 
white and blue „Britain Stronger In Europe‟ logo. The full name was the result of 
market research. The word „Britain‟ was substantial as it appealed to the patriotic vote, 
along with the three-coloured scheme. The expression „Stronger‟ had a clear impact on 
Cooper‟s focus groups and „Europe‟ was essential for people to perceive what the 
campaign really defended. It is worth to be mentioned that the opponents abbreviated 
the name to „BSE‟ – the acronym connected with „mad cow disease‟, one of the worst 
periods of UK-EU relations in the 1990s – in order to offend and undermine the profile 
of „In‟ campaign. 
The campaign‟s formal establishment required efficient cooperation with businesses 
and celebrities. Thus, the team recruited Gabe Winn to run the outreach work with 
business world, a well-known executive from the energy company Centrica, whose 
brother was a political producer in Sky News. Furthermore, „In‟ campaign succeeded an 
extensive financial support by approaching investment banks and by getting 
Conservative donations (Shipman, 2017).  
By the end of November, the „Stronger In‟ had outlined and followed a specific 
strategy, all included in their plan-book called „war book‟ or „messaging bible‟. 
According to Cooper, they had written down the segmentation and underlined their 
strongest messages either in a sentence, paragraph or page. The aim was to concentrate 
on the two persuadable groups, the „Disengaged Middle‟ and the „Heats v Heads‟, 
which Cooper estimated through statistical analysis that were susceptible to economic 
risk arguments. The Remainers also identified that the opponents would counter them 
with arguments on immigration, sovereignty and cost that were regarded as „Stronger 
In‟s weaknesses. For this reason, they conducted focus-groups sessions to test and 
evaluate their precise messages and the rebuttals in order to enrich the campaign 
planning (Shipman, 2017). 
In pursuance of the appropriate board and chairman, „Stronger In‟ ended up to Stuart 
Rose, the former Marks & Spencer‟s chairman. Lucy Thomas admitted that ―Stuart 
was exactly what we needed as a chair to make the pragmatic, reasonable and 
patriotic case. He had run one of the best-loved British brands and had a reputation of 
being a highly successful businessman as well as nice, decent bloke. He was also 
Eurosceptic who was rightly critical of the way the EU worked and in favor of 
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significant reform‖ (Shipman, 2017). Admittedly, the full membership of the 
campaign‟s board was formed to demonstrate breadth and experience, joining in 
business, political, culture, education and military establishments. Subsequently, it was 
declared that the three former Prime Ministers – Sir John Major, Tony Blair and 
Gordon Brown – along with Sir Richard Branson, the most well-known businessman, 
were also backing the campaign. 
Last but not least, „Stronger In‟ decided to appoint James McGrory as a media operator 
to compete against „Vote Leave‟s Paul Stephenson. The referendum battleground 
would be characterized by the clash of two of the most qualified spin doctors of their 
generation. 
 
1.c. Labour In for Britain 
 
In the run-up to the referendum, along with the official „In‟ and „Out‟ campaigns, the 
Labour Party pronounced the formation of its own pro-EU campaign, separated from 
the 'Stronger In'. The main reason of this attempt derived from the opinion of many 
Labour politicians that during the referendum of the Scottish Independence, 
campaigning alongside the Conservatives proved to be a mistake. According to their 
point of view, Labour's involvement had a negative effect to their supporters and the 
party lost all but one of its Scottish seats in 2015's elections. Nevertheless, Will Straw 
claimed that the establishment of a shared platform between Labours and 
Conservatives would benefit both of them to gain votes by showing economic 
credibility. Additionally, he underlined that an underfunded and isolated Labour 
campaign might not succeed to encourage Labour supporters to vote, especially in low-
turnout areas. This would consequently undermine any efforts to keep the United 
Kingdom in the EU. 
Notwithstanding Straw‟s warnings, „Labour In for Britain‟ was eventually launched by 
Alan Johnson. The new campaign used a memorable slogan called „JIGSI‟, which 
stood for jobs, investment, growth, security and influence in the world (Shipman, 
2017).  
 
1.d. Conservatives for Britain 
 
The declaration of the EU referendum led to a civil war within the Conservative Party. 
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Prior to the designation of the official Brexit campaign, many eurosceptic MPs decided 
to be united in running their own campaigning organization. As a result, in June 2015, 
Steve Baker, a Tory MP, launched „Conservatives for Britain‟ (CfB). Remarkably, the 
„guerrilla warfare‟ strategy that Steve Baker devised played a decisive role in the 
referendum‟s result. As soon as he became the chairman of CfB, he read and applied 
specific strategic plans described explicitly in the „The Art of War‟ and „The Thirty-
Three Strategies of War‘ books. Baker gained the insight that all battles are won in the 
preparation and he deliberately used guerilla tactics against his own party leadership to 
succeed his aims (Shipman, 2017). 
One of the first accomplishments of Baker‟s „military‟ campaign was to persuade the 
Electoral Commission to modify the wording of the referendum‟s question. Taking as 
reference the cases of 1975 referendum and the Scottish plebiscite, the Eurosceptics 
believed that the Yes/No option on the ballot paper would benefit the „In‟ campaign, 
since voting positively for the status quo seemed more attractive to people rather than 
voting „No‟ (Shipman, 2017). Moreover, the importance of the question was 
demonstrated by the polling from ICM. More specifically, the results highlighted that 
when voters were asked “Should the UK remain a member of the EU?” 59 per cent 
answered „Yes‟, while in the question “Should the United Kingdom remain a member 
of the European Union or leave the European Union?” only 55 per cent chose to 
remain. Based on that evidence, Baker urged the Commission to conduct its own 
research and amend the original unbalanced question, where only the „Remain‟ option 
was clarified.  
The second victory of „Conservatives for Britain‟ was associated with the timing of the 
referendum. Cameron and ministers identified the benefits of holding the referendum 
on 5 May, the day when the local elections in England, Scotland and Wales were also 
scheduled. The Eurosceptics considered that Conservatives might run a double-sided 
campaign, prompting the public to vote the Tories in council elections and „Remain‟ in 
the referendum. Along with the Labour Party, who worried that this might cost them 
seats in the local elections, Baker‟s team convinced the government to change the 
referendum date.  
The most crucial battle was the third one that concerned the issue of „Purdah‟. “Purdah 
is the UK‘s civil service term for the time between the formal start of an election 
campaign and the announcement of the results‖ (Shipman, 2017, White, 2015). During 
that period, government executives and agents are not allowed to take actions or make 
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statements regarding the following election in order not to influence the voters In the 
majority of British elections there is usually a purdah period of twenty-eight days. 
Cameron‟s government intended to omit purdah rules in the EU referendum campaign, 
claiming that it would affect government‟s dealings with Brussels and many ministers 
might face legal action in the case of a statement on the EU (Shipman, 2017). 
„Conservatives for Britain‟ perceived that plan as an attempt by Cameron to deploy 
propaganda until polling day and accused the government of bending the rules for its 
own benefit
25
.  Eventually, eurosceptic Conservatives cooperated with „Vote Leave‟ 
and its research team to urge an amendment of the Referendum Bill. Due to the fact 
that Labour Party lined up with the SNP and the „rebels‟, the amendment was ratified, 
constraining ministers and officials from making statements on the EU directly linked 
to the referendum. 
Furthermore, „Conservatives for Britain‟ played a vital role in Cameron‟s decision 
about neutralizing the Conservative Party on the issue of the referendum-campaign. 
More specifically, the Conservative board unanimously agreed in September that the 
party and its personnel would keep neutral stance and would not be involved in the 
campaigns. That decision was based on the fact that divisions might be created within 
the Party, since two thirds of the activists supported Brexit and were reluctant to side 
with Remain. The resolution had two practical consequences. Notably, the Remain 
campaign would not able to exploit the £7 million amount permitted by the Electoral 
Commission. ―The equivalent of the entire budget of ‗Vote Leave‘ was taken out of the 
Remain campaign by keeping the Conservative Party neutral‖, admitted Baker 
(Shipman, 2017). Moreover, the Tory MPS would not be allowed to utilize their own 
canvassing data in order to target voters. 
Two months later, an amendment to the Bill was passed by Labour and the Liberal 
Democrats in the House of Lords to authorize the vote to sixteen- and seventeen-year-
olds. Cameron, along with Baker‟s supporters, disapproved the plan. Despite the fact 
that it would benefit Labour in general elections, the Eurosceptics tried to avoid an 
influx of young people likely to vote „Remain‟ (Shipman, 2017). 
Last but not least, the main accomplishment of „Conservatives for Britain‟ was to 
assure that the ministers would not be bound by collective responsibility. Cameron 
agreed to suspend cabinet collective responsibility during the referendum campaign 
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and announced in January 2016 that ―There will be a clear government position, but it 
will be open to individual ministers to take a different personal position while 
remaining part of the government‖ (Shipman, 2017). Remarkably, in a six-month 
period, „Conservatives for Britain‟ executed efficiently Steve Baker‟s war strategy 
(Shipman, 2017).  
 
2. The Deal 
 
 It could be considered that Cameron's renegotiation was mainly characterized by 
deliberate manoeuvers and was not based on a long-planned strategy (Shipman, 2017). 
He had pledged to British people fundamental reform in 2014, and outlined that the 
main changes in UK and EU relationship would involve; tougher immigration controls 
– particularly for citizens of new EU member states, additional powers to national 
parliaments including the ability to veto proposed EU laws, a reduction in bureaucracy 
for businesses along with new free-trade agreements and a lessening of the influence of 
European Institutions on police and courts
26
. Consequently, the expectations of 
Eurosceptics had been raised. 
Despite his initial determination, Prime Minister progressively moderated his demands 
from Brussels. This was particularly observed by Craig Oliver, Cameron‟s director of 
Communications, who toughened government‟s rhetoric in order to conceal this fact. 
Specifically in November 2015, when Cameron prepared to send a letter regarding 
additional details of his aims to the European Council‟s president, Donald Tusk, Oliver 
briefed the newspapers that PM might side with Brexiters supposing that his demands 
were not met: ―If we can‘t reach such an agreement… we will have to think again 
about whether this European Union is right for us‖27. However, after the letter was 
debated in the Commons, Eurosceptic MPS and journalists noticed that the requests 
had softened and sought to expose Cameron. This was notably illustrated in Sun‟s 
article-headline „ARE EU KIDDING?‟, while the Mail published a paper with the title  
„IS THAT IT, MR CAMERON?‟ , explaining that the prime minister was “in retreat 
over plans to strip benefits from EU migrant workers‖ 28. 
In fact, the major media confrontation between Downing Street and Leave campaign 
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occurred in February, when the final deal was made, and shaped considerably the 
public views (Shipman, 2017). The last summit between Cameron and his EU partners 
was held on 18 February and the PM claimed to the reporters he was there to ―battle 
for Britain‖. After the 31-hour marathon of negotiation, Cameron emerged to declare 
his accomplishment: ―I believe we are stronger, safer, and better off inside a reformed 
EU, and that is why I will be campaigning with all my heart and soul to persuade the 
British people to remain‖ (Shipman, 2017). The slogan „Stronger, Safer, Better off‟ 
was a creation of Remain‟s team, who included powerful emotional words in their 
script to persuade the electorate. However, the Eurosceptics agreed that Cameron did 
not reach their expectations and released an effective media barrage. Richard Tice, the 
„Leave.EU‟ co-chairman, stated publicly that ―The prime minister promised half a 
loaf, begged for a crust and came home with crumbs‖ (Shipman, 2017). 
Cameron‟s team realized that it would have big media coverage and asked „Stronger 
In‟ digital group to organize a „Twitter war room‟ with business leaders, MPs and other 
influential supporters advocating that PM had brought a good deal. Nevertheless, 
„Leave‟ campaign‟s reaction and preparedness weakened Remainers‟ efforts. Their 
purposeful strategic approach succeeded in turning the print media into their natural 
allies focusing on what was missing from the final EU agreement. An opinion poll by 
ComRes shortly afterwards indicated that only 21 per cent of voters considered the 
deal to be good. Indeed, the Sun and the Daily Mail campaigned intensely for leaving 
the EU, while the Daily Telegraph, although it gave a fair hearing to Cameron, had 
links to Ukip which also backed Brexit. The Times and the Sunday Times were initially 
neutral but they eventually split; The Times for Remain and the second one for Leave. 
On the other hand, the Guardian and the Independent might support „Stronger In‟ but 
their dwindling circulation, along with the kind of readers they addressed to, did not 
help Remainers to convince specific target-voters. Only the Mail of Sunday and the 
Mirror papers used to speak adequately on behalf of Remain. Furthermore, Oliver‟s 
previous work experience in BBC allowed him to intervene in the main BBC television 
bulletins at 6 and 10 p.m. By calling the right correspondent or editor, he was able to 
alter the running order of the news or the tone of the coverage (Shipman, 2017).  
The poor public and media reception for the deal led ultimately „Britain Stronger In 
Europe‟ to remove it from their strategic playbook and promote instead their core 
messages. Due to the lack of efficient and persuasive solutions on immigration, the 
„Remain‟ campaign decided to concentrate on economy and risk.  
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Finally, it should be mentioned that Brexit side gained significant advantage at that 
point, since six influential cabinet ministers resolved to back „Vote Leave‟ for the final 
designation. Notably, the Secretary of State for Justice, Michael Gove, arrived together 
with the other five ministers at Westminster Tower after the cabinet meeting, signing a 
giant placard quoting „Let‟s take back control‟. They followed the instructions of „Vote 
Leave‟ strategists, who concluded that having all of them with that big pledge wall 
would be a powerful image and an effective demonstration of strength (Shipman, 
2017). In the same manner, another key figure from Conservative Party, Boris 
Johnson, decided to campaign to leave changing significantly the course of events 
across the political spectrum. 
 
3. Project Fear 
 
 Having lost the support of the most influential MPs, David Cameron along with 
„Stronger In‟ leaders sought to use alternative means to enhance the campaigning 
advantages of government. 
The Prime Minister arranged personal meetings with MPs to secure they would side 
with Remain and „In‟ campaign team tried to convince voters based on two main 
themes; the economy and security of Britain. Accordingly, they devised one positive 
message, the „Stronger, Safer, Better Off‟ argument regarding the benefits of EU 
membership, and a negative one linked to a potential economic disaster: ‗Don‘t risk it. 
Leaving the EU would be a leap in the dark.‘ Remarkably, they also utilized the 
„testimonial‟ technique to affect public‟s opinion by publishing a letter from two 
hundred business leaders pointing out that ―leaving the EU would deter investment and 
threaten jobs. It would put the economy at risk‖29. The letter included the signatures of 
well-known companies such as British Telecom, Vodafone, Marks &Spencer and 
Kingfisher. Correspondingly, an additional formal letter was circulated, incorporating 
the views of thirteen retired military commanders warning that Britain should remain 
in the EU to protect itself from „grave security threats‘, posed mainly by Russia and 
Islamic State (Shipman, 2017). „Stronger In‟s endeavor to persuade the electorate was 
completed with a letter from NGO luminaries – including Action Aid, Oxfam, 
Christian Aid, Save the Children and the World Wildlife Fund – claiming that the EU 
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membership assisted in fund efforts to deal with poverty in Africa and the 
humanitarian emergency in Syria (Shipman, 2017). 
An issue arose when two of the army signatories accused obliquely the Remain 
campaign for applying propaganda. General Rose announced he had only asked to read 
the pro-European letter and had never endorsed it, while Lord Bramall admitted he was 
intimidated to sign it.
30
 However, the PR offensive had an immediate effect on public‟s 
opinion, since the surveys conducted in early March put „Remain‟ ahead of „Leave‟ for 
the first time after two months (Shipman, 2017). Due to the effectiveness of that 
policy, „Stronger In‟ followed the same approach and published further letters and 
articles from entrepreneurs, former NHS chiefs, former UN Secretaries General and 
former intelligence executive directors backing Remain. Notably, towards the end of 
May, they also issued an anti-Brexit letter signed by celebrities, which urged voters to 
support Britain‟s EU membership. 
Leave campaign‟s respond to these establishment endorsements was to adopt a 
rebellious attitude towards the business world. Based on the fact that none of the 
enterprises backed Brexit, they tried to undermine the opponent‟s efforts by arguing 
that ―It‘s the establishment versus the real people‖. This was an attempt to 
differentiate the concerns of ordinary people from those of business administrators. 
Moreover, the Eurosceptics sought to apply counterpropaganda, labeling any action 
and every intervention by Remainers as a part of „Project Fear‟. Accordingly, they 
accused the government for abusing its position, particularly in April, when it was 
announced that £9.3 million of taxpayers‟ money would be used for the production and 
distribution of pro-EU leaflets to every country‟s house. The Brexiters denounced it as 
„Project Fear Propaganda‟ (Shipman, 2017). 
It could be concluded that „Vote Leave‟ had mainly their own words as an offensive 
weapon against the weight of the establishment. In line with this, Gove deployed an 
aggressive rhetoric, blaming the EU for inciting the rise of „Hitler worshippers‟ in 
Europe. Johnson also utilized the Nazi dictator as a rhetorical device but none of these 
attempts seemed to be really successful (Shipman, 2017). In this regard, they appeared 
to exploit the major authority figure - and the most respectful symbol across United 
Kingdom- Her Majesty the Queen. On 8 March, the Sun published a paper detailing an 
alleged quarrel between the monarch and –then deputy PM- Nick Clegg over Europe, 
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claiming to him that ―the EU was heading in the wrong direction‖ (Shipman, 
2017).The article also revealed another case when the queen supposedly confessed to a 
group of parliamentarians, “I don‟t understand Europe”31. Buckingham Palace 
denounced all the allegations, while Gove disclaimed responsibility for those reports. 
Nevertheless, the story helped Vote Leave eliminate Stronger In‟s media domination 
for a week and thwarted any government‟s plans to deploy the Queen for its own 
benefit (Shipman, 2017). 
 
4. Trade and Security; Barack Obama’s visit 
 
The competition between the two opposing sides began to intensify as the day of the 
plebiscite approached. „Stronger In‟ confuted constantly all Brexiters‟ arguments about 
which country Britain would most closely resemble after Brexit, regarding its trade 
relationship with European Union. Norway was one of their first suggestions due to the 
fact that it was a member of a single market without being an EU member. However, 
the European Economic Area (EEA) agreement involved complying with EU rules 
without having the ability to set them, accepting the free movement of people and 
contributing to the EU budget. Another possible option was Switzerland, which was a 
member of the European Free Trade Area (EFTA) and had signed many different 
bilateral treaties with the European Union. That case suggested though that Britain 
should negotiate numerous separate agreements with the EU for various goods and 
services. Boris Johnson also proposed that Britain could make a deal like the 
Canadians based on trade with no tariffs (Shipman, 2017). David Cameron responded 
immediately, tweeting that such a plan would mean seven or more years of uncertainty. 
Although the Remain campaign advocated that „Vote Leave‟ could not find an 
alternative solution in the case of Brexit, Michael Gove insisted that there was a free 
trade zone extending from Ireland to Turkey that all European countries have access to, 
regardless of whether they are members of the EU or the Eurozone. He pointed out that 
since countries such as Bosnia, Serbia, Ukraine and Albania were part of that free trade 
area, under no circumstances would Britain be excluded. Stronger In‟s team seized on 
Gove‟s assertion that Britain should emulate Albania – a rather small and 
impoverished country – and texted the journalists to present it as a blunder (Shipman, 
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2017). It could be claimed that there was an attempt by Remain side to use propaganda, 
in order to undermine the arguments of Eurosceptics, by reproducing only a part of 
what Gove had stated. 
It was essential for Brexit supporters to reconstruct their arguments concerning the 
single market, especially ahead of a rather hard week for the campaign because of 
Barack Obama's arrival. A visit from the President of the U.S. had been included in 
government‟s agenda already since Cameron called the referendum, and the Queen‟s 
ninetieth birthday celebrations in April would constitute the ideal cover for a visit to 
United Kingdom by America‟s first family (Shipman, 2017). Remarkably, Downing 
Street prepared the ground for Obama‟s narrative just the day before with a letter to 
The Times from eight former US Treasury Secretaries. They warned that a possible 
withdrawal from the EU would constitute a „risky bet‟, explaining that ―If Britain exits, 
it should not take for granted its global primacy when it is no longer the gateway to 
Europe‖ (Shipman, 2017). On the other side, Brexiters had sent a letter to the US 
ambassador a month earlier, urging Obama not to be engaged in the EU debate because 
his intervention might undermine the „validity‟ of the referendum‟s result. 
Additionally, Boris Johnson published an article in the Sun based on 2009 reports, 
presenting evidence that President‟s foreign policy pivoted away from Europe. More 
specifically, he highlighted that one of the first Obama‟s actions as president was to 
return to the British embassy a bust of Winston Churchill which stood in the Oval 
Office (Shipman, 2017). Eurosceptics were apparently aware of the fact that any 
Obama‟s statement might influence the voters and thus tried to undermine his 
credibility. 
Cameron and Obama arrived for the press conference after 5 p.m., deliberately timed 
before The Six O‘Clock News. The President started his speech declaring that, ―This is 
a decision for the people of the United Kingdom to make‖ and underlined that he was 
not there to ―fix any votes‖. Nonetheless, when he continued on the trade deal, Obama 
hardened his rhetoric warning the British people that ―they would get no special favors 
from the United States‖ and argued using the sentence: ―The UK is going to be in the 
back of the queue‖. Notably, it was widely observed that the U.S. President used an 
American phrase – „In‟ the back, instead of „at‟ the back – followed by the English 
word „queue‟, where he would instinctively have used „line‟ instead (Shipman, 2017). 
Obama‟s speech could be considered as the best moment for Remain camp as it 
invalidated all Brexiters‟ claims that if Britain left the EU, it would be helped by its 
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closest ally and would be put at the top of the list for a bilateral free-trade deal. It 
should be noted that „Stronger In‟ realized that the media would comment upon the 
queue/line aspect and tried to downplay any suggestion of collusion. In particular, 
Craig Oliver stressed to journalists that ―This is the leader of the free world. He is not 
some puppet we can get parroting what we want‖ (Shipman, 2017). However, the 
enraged Eurosceptics sought to refute the president‟s statements, pointing out that 
Obama would not be president at the time a trade deal was negotiated. In the absence 
of any effective rebuttal, some of them also used a populist rhetoric. For example, 
Justice Minister Dominic Raab demonstrated that British people would not be 
blackmailed by anyone, while Ukip MEP Patrick O‟Flynn tweeted: ―What has Dave 
got lined up next? Invite Angela Merkel over to say she will invade us if we vote 
―Leave‖?‖ (Shipman, 2017). 
Brexit campaigners were confident that Obama‟s intervention would have no impact 
on the public. Their judgment was confirmed later by polls showing no boost for 
„Stronger In‟. On the contrary, three of the five polls conducted after Obama‟s visit put 
Leave ahead. Stronger In‟s attempts to promote Britain‟s place in the world, relying 
merely on third-party endorsements and well-known foreign figures, proved 
unsuccessful and was viewed by voters as „patronizing‟ (Shipman, 2017). Moreover, 
Cameron‟s repeated efforts to demonstrate that the UK was safer in an interconnected 
system also failed, based on the following events. 
The Sunday Times published on 8 May a warning from the former heads of MI5 and 
MI6, Jonathan Evans and Sir John Sawers, that leaving the EU could damage 
intelligence sharing and might undermine UK‟s ability to protect itself from terrorists. 
On the same day, Downing Street sent out to newspapers a briefing with parts of the 
speech Cameron was expected to make the following day, regarding how the EU had 
helped maintain the peace in Europe since 1945 (Shipman, 2017). It was accompanied 
by a video of four veterans of the Second World War speaking emotionally about why 
they did not want to see the unity they had fought for disintegrated. Both endeavors 
were an appeal to fear and emotion, however, they brought undesirable results and 
caused a media frenzy. Cameron‟s speech was seen as another example of Fear 
because it implied that a vote for Brexit might lead to war. The Sun‟s headline the next 
morning read: ―BREXIT could see Europe descend into World War Three, David 
Cameron will say today‖, while in the Times‟ front page was written, ―Brexit will raise 
risk of world war, PM claims‖ (Shipman, 2017). Consequently, the „World War Three‟ 
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speech – as it became known – damaged Cameron‟s credibility and also overshadowed 
the rest of the argument points on security theme. 
 
5. Budget and Economic Arguments 
 
In the run-up to the budget, the government decided to apply some new economic 
measures, particularly designed to appease the middle-England voters that Cameron 
and Osborne wished to „gain‟ ahead of the referendum. More specifically, it was 
announced that the tax-free allowance for income tax would be raised to £11,500 and 
the tax threshold from £40,000 to £45,000 (Shipman, 2017). However, the new fiscal 
measures were based on cuts to disability benefit, which was given to 600,000 people 
with long-term health problems. Ian Duncan Smith, the secretary of the Department for 
Work and Pensions (DWP), was irritated that benefit cuts were used as an offset 
against tax cuts for the middle class. Many Tory MPs complained as well, and urged 
Osborne to reconsider, but Downing Street demanded that the DWP defend the cuts. 
As a result, Duncan Smith decided to resign by sending a letter and a resignation 
statement to the media (Shipman, 2017). He claimed in the letter that the government 
reneged on Osborne‟s promise that „We are all in this together‟ implying that the 
Chancellor was more interested in numbers than people. The following day, he 
appeared to The Andrew Marr Show – where initially Sir John Major would appear to 
make the case for the Remain campaign – and gave an impassionate speech. He 
explained his decision and articulated his feelings and concerns for the disabled, while 
he confirmed that his stance was irrelevant with the issue of Europe. Nonetheless, 
Duncan Smith supported Brexit and the Downing Street considered his resignation as 
an intended attempt to calumniate them (Shipman, 2017). 
Regardless of his initial motivation, Duncan Smith‟s attack had a serious impact on 
Osborne. The success of the Remain campaign relied on convincing people to trust 
their economic arguments, yet the reputation of the main advocate of that policy was 
damaged. 
Nevertheless, during May, the two opposing sides entered into a new debate on trade 
and economy, in which „Stronger In‟ declared victory. Gove stated explicitly in an 
interview to BBC that United Kingdom should be out of the single market. The fact 
that Vote Leave‟s chairman declared that Britain should not be a part of a free trade 
area of five hundred million people, where the country did more than 40% of its 
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business, helped Remain campaign to achieve the first goal of its strategy and raise the 
sense of economic risk around Brexit. Osborne argued to the media that ―leaving the 
largest free trade area in the world (…) would be catastrophic for the people‘s jobs, 
their incomes and their livelihoods‖ (Shipman, 2017). 
„Stronger In‟ was determined to follow the same strategic playbook that led to victory 
in the Scottish referendum. The first part of their operation plan was to publish reports 
by the Treasury on the dangers of Brexit, while the second one involved deploying 
third-party endorsements to support Osborne‟s case about the risks of leaving the EU. 
The chancellor was well connected with key players because he had been for six years 
on the top table of many international finance events. One of the key figures that were 
deployed was Christine Lagarde, the head of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). 
The IMF regarded Brexit as a high risk in the latest World Economic Outlook that 
downgraded the forecasts for economic growth in Britain, while Maurice Obstfeld, the 
organization‟s chief economist, declared that ―a Brexit would do severe regional and 
global damage‖. In line with these statements, David Cameron tweeted ―The IMF is 
right – leaving the EU would pose major risks‖ (Shipman, 2017). On the other hand, 
„Vote Leave‟ seized on these warnings and ominous forecasts and used them as 
evidence that the chancellor and the Prime Minister intended to „talk down Britain‘, a 
theme that would sway the voters. 
Moreover, Osborne circulated a two hundred page document detailing the long term 
economic risks in case of Brexit. Admittedly, the word „risk‟ had penetrated into the 
British people‟s subconscious, since the Remainers used it repeatedly. Osborne‟s paper 
included particular statistics showing that Britain would be poorer by 2030, costing 
each UK household £4,300, if the public decided to leave the EU. However, the 
statistical data were ambiguous and misleading. The figure of £4,300 per household 
had resulted from dividing the total loss of a GDP by the number of households 
without a reference to actual family incomes. Additionally, the amount was based on 
the number of households in 2015 and not on how many they were expected to be in 
2030. Brexiters released a rebuttal of that Treasury‟s analysis document explaining that 
the £4,300 figure meant a growth to the sum of households, from twenty-seven million 
in 2015 to more than thirty-one million in 2030, much of it originated from 
immigration (Shipman, 2017). According to Eurosceptics, these projections failed to 
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consider new trade deals with countries outside the EU and also indicated that the 
government would break its promise to reduce net migration
32
 (Riley-Smith, 2016). 
Despite the fact that the Treasury‟s report received a lot of criticism, it got a big 
broadcast coverage and helped „Stronger In‟ dominate the media for a week. Will 
Straw admitted that ―numbers are the most compelling way‖ to get coverage and 
public‟s interest (Shipman, 2017). Remarkably, Brexiters believed they were losing on 
the economy and decided to neutralize it as an issue. At the same time, they had great 
difficulty raising funds for the campaign, since most of the potential donors came 
under huge pressure from Cameron‟s allies not to give any money (Shipman, 2017). 
The Remain side was committed to its strategic plan and deployed one of the most 
trusted voices on the economy to address the public regarding the risks of Brexit. That 
key figure was the governor of the Bank of England, Mark Carney, who gave a speech 
in front of a House of Lords Select Committee warning that Brexit could cause higher 
inflation and lower growth, which would inevitably lead the City of London to lose its 
place as one of the greatest financial centers in the world (Shipman, 2017). Nigel 
Farage realized that Cameron and Osborne were running a referendum campaign based 
on negativity – exactly the same approach followed in the Scottish referendum and the 
general election. He argued that there was not given a single good reason why people 
should vote to stay in the EU. Conversely, Leave campaign advocated that “Britain is 
going to be stronger, safer, better, more global” outside the EU, which was an uplifting 
message (Shipman, 2017).  
By the beginning of May, „Stronger In‟ was convinced that it was the outright winner 
of the economy debate. They had demonstrated that the Brexiters wanted to withdraw 
from the single market and had won the support of almost every major international 
economic institution. They had also released a memorable figure referring to the scale 
of economic risk and managed to draw media‟s attention. However, towards the end of 
the month, Cooper‟s tracking polls put Remain behind proving that the voters were 
very skeptical about the campaign‟s messages. There was evidence that people could 
not evaluate if their arguments were true because they did not understand economy and 
made no connection between lower growth and less money for the public services 
(Shipman, 2017). Cooper concluded that the public could not perceive the damage 
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Britain‟s economy would suffer and proposed they explained in simple terms their 
claims. He also observed that their interventions were heavily focused on risk – 
Treasury, IMF, Carney, prices – and advised his team to reinforce more the “Stronger, 
safer and better off” message. As a result, David Cameron appeared in his second 
television debate on Question Time and followed Cooper‟s first advice explaining 
comprehensively to the audience that ―a hit to the economy would mean less money for 
the NHS and other public services‖ (Shipman, 2017). 
Nevertheless, a second problem emerged for „Stronger In‟, when the polling and the 
focus groups showed that the electorate was reluctant to believe any report by the 
Treasury, including the £4,300 per household figure, which was too specific to be 
believable. Coetzee pointed out that those bold assertions about the future undermined 
and invalidated the campaign‟s claims that a Brexit vote would lead to uncertainty. 
Moreover, the economy-risk arguments were delivered by Cameron and Osborne, who 
both faced credibility problems – the Prime Minister because of the deal and the World 
War III speech and the chancellor due to the budget debacle (Shipman, 2017). There 
was also an attempt by „Stronger In‟ to change the course and advocate a more positive 
message but the media started to lose interest in the economic arguments. Eventually, 
the campaign decided to concentrate heavily on immigration (Shipman, 2017).  
Concerning the Brexit side, Vote Leave insisted on their statement that the £350 
million that Britain sent per week to Brussels would be better spent within the country. 
The team‟s particular logo had been emblazoned on the campaign bus and it was 
attached to almost every email sent by the campaign. Leave side wanted to make an 
important point about the money and undermine Osborne‟s economic-risk offensive 
strategy. However, the rebate money never left Britain, so it was inaccurate to claim 
that the country ‗sent‘ £350 million every week to EU. „Stronger In‟ accused „Vote 
Leave‟ of promoting that message ―even though it was a straightforward lie and it was 
exposed‖. On the other hand, Cummings supported that ―every time there was a row 
about the size of the cost to taxpayers of EU membership, it simply reinforced in 
voters‘ minds that there was a high cost‖  (Shipman, 2017). Focus groups interaction 
proved that the people were influenced by numbers. 
In conclusion, Remain campaigners praised themselves for winning the economy 
debate in an environment of „post-truth politics‟, while Brexit side continued on telling 
voters that their money was wasted in the EU. In any case, Stephenson admitted that if 
a citizen was asked about the EU, they would argue that it costed hundred million 
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pounds per week and – although some of it returned to UK – most of it ended up in 
Greece (Shipman, 2017). 
 
6. Ad Hominem Attacks and Immigration Issue 
 
In April, the so-called Panama Papers were released, which are million leaked 
documents with detailed financial information for offshore entities.  The government 
seemed to be in a fortunate position, since none of the cabinet‟s serving members were 
included. However, the BBC‟s Panorama revealed that Blairmore Holdings, a 
company owned by Cameron‟s late father, used Mossack Fonseca, the Central 
American corporation responsible for these documents. After incessant public pressure 
to disclose details about his finances, the Prime Minister published extensive 
information about his tax return. Nonetheless, his document also unveiled the amount 
of £300,000 inheritance Cameron received from his father and £200,000 cash he 
accepted from his mother as a supplement to that inheritance. The press pointed out 
that the sum might not be liable to inheritance tax and assumed that the money could 
have come from Blairmore. The way media handled that issue aroused voters‟ 
suspicion about the Prime Minister‟s financial activities. „Vote Leave‟ seized on that 
incident and posted a video on Facebook, saying in effect, ―David Cameron has been 
fiddling his taxes for years, how can you trust him in Europe?‖ (Shipman, 2017). 
Cameron complained to „Leave‟ campaigners about the viral video and the 
implications he was lying about his tax arrangements, and asked them to avoid ad 
hominem attacks. Although Boris Johnson agreed, he gave an interview for the Sunday 
Times and the Sun on Sunday the following day, personally attacking David Cameron, 
George Osborne and Theresa May for failing to keep their pledge and secure a deal 
with Brussels that only EU migrants with a job could enter Britain. Downing Street 
was hugely irritated by Johnson‟s line and urged the Prime Minister to wage a 
counterattack, especially on Leave‟s official spokesmen, Gove and Johnson, who were 
gaining credibility and authority. However, Cameron was reluctant from the beginning 
to be involved in a quarrel with another Conservative (Shipman 2017). 
In mid-May, the „Vote Leave‟ campaign decided to pursue a more aggressive policy. 
Cummings stated repeatedly to his team that ―If you want to win this campaign, you 
have to hit David Cameron on the combined subjects of money, the NHS and 
immigration. What we are going to talk about in the campaign is 350 million quid, 
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immigration, Turkey‖ (Shipman, 2017). It should be noted that those key messages 
were already included in parts of the campaign that Cummings was responsible for, 
such as the viral videos, the leaflets and social media advertising. Additionally, the 
Sunday Telegraph published on 15 May an interview, in which Boris Johnson 
compared the European Commission‟s endeavor to form a superstate with Hitler‟s 
Third Reich. He pointed out that the European Union constitutes an attempt to unite 
Europe under a single government by simply using different methods from Hitler and 
other people who also had the same aim. His statements caused uproar and the pro-
European politician, Michael Heseltine, appeared on television to denounce Boris for 
making those “preposterous, obscene” claims. George Osborne was convinced that 
Boris Johnson was the most effective and persuasive voice within Vote Leave, hence 
they should undermine his credibility. On the other hand, Cummings vowed to provide 
stories to emphasize the Tory civil war. Moreover, he persuaded Gove and Johnson to 
continue the ad hominem attacks, especially after a story published by the Sun, 
revealing that the „Remain‟ campaign was spreading false rumors about a sex scandal, 
in which supposedly Boris Johnson‟s wife was also involved. That was used as 
evidence to the Conservative politician that the opponents would do anything to 
destroy him personally (Shipman, 2017).  
A significant moment for „Vote Leave‟ was the day when the latest immigration 
figures were disclosed. More specifically, towards the end of May, it was published 
that net migration had reached 330,000 during 2015, nearly half of it coming from 
other EU countries. Remarkably, that number exceeded the upper limit of the 
government‟s ‗tens of thousands‘ plan. In addition, the government had concealed 
some HRMC immigration statistics, which, however, appeared in the front page of 
many national newspapers. Subsequently, Johnson did plenty of television and radio 
interviews, stating that he supported immigration but he argued about control and 
democracy. Along with Gove, he also wrote a letter which was published by the 
Sunday Times under the headline ‗Boris and Gove lash Cameron on immigration‘. The 
main section of the letter read: ―Voters were promised repeatedly at elections that net 
immigration could be cut to the tens of thousands. This promise is plainly not 
achievable as long as the UK is a member of the EU and the failure to keep it is 
corrosive of public trust in politics‖ (Shipman, 2017). Although they did not want to 
insult the Prime Minister, the press regarded their intervention as a „direct challenge to 
David Cameron‟s authority‟ (Shipman, 2017). Furthermore, the Conservative MP Priti 
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Patel wrote to the Sunday Telegraph, accusing Cameron and Osborne of being too 
wealthy to understand people‟s concern about immigration.  Eventually, those blue-on-
blue attacks allowed the media to relinquish Stronger In‟s economic warnings and 
develop a completely new narrative. 
In June, Brexiters decided to issue their first policy regarding the control of 
immigration. Gove and Johnson demonstrated that a post-Brexit government would 
adopt a points-based system for immigration, following the example of Australia. They 
announced that migrants would be prohibited from entering Britain unless they had the 
right qualifications and a good command of English language. They also pointed out 
that the scale of immigration had put „strain‟ on public services, and if Britain 
remained in the EU, the waiting lists would lengthen and the class sizes would rise 
(Shipman, 2017). „Stronger In‟ tried to issue a respond based on facts and argued that 
the Australian points-based system actually allowed the entry to a higher number of 
people compared to its population than the current British system for non-EU migrants. 
Implanting the idea of an „alternative‟ government in journalists‟ minds was Paul 
Stephenson‟s sole aim when he suggested the policy proposals. In mid-June, Vote 
Leave released a „roadmap‟ of six new laws that they would introduce in the case of 
Brexit. The scheme included legislation regarding the withdrawal from the 1972 
European Communities Act, a special Finance Bill to deduct VAT from household 
fuel, a Free Trade Bill, an NHS Funding Bill to channel the extra money to the NHS, 
an Asylum and Immigration Control Bill and, last but not least, an Emergency 
Provisions Bill to cease the supremacy of the European Court of Justice and remove 
from the UK all those EU citizens ‗whose presence is not conducive to the public 
good‘. The glut of the announcements immediately attracted media‟s attention 
(Shipman, 2017). 
At the time Gove and Johnson began to act like a government in waiting, the formal 
purdah period had started. Thus, the real government could not provide further support 
to Remain campaign. From that point onwards, the civil service was forbidden from 
doing anything that could affect the result of the referendum and both campaigns could 
only spend £7 million each to run their operation (Shipman, 2017). That also meant 
that Stronger In could no longer have access to government reports or get advice from 
officials. Conversely, the start of purdah constituted a perfect moment and a key 
turning point for Leave campaigners. Matthew Elliott admitted that they gained a 
competitive advantage during the purdah period, since they were able to determine the 
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broadcast agenda and the BBC offered more balanced coverage to both sides.  
It was acknowledged that „Vote Leave‟ chose the most appropriate time to give weight 
to the immigration issue. The point that purdah came into effect, immigration was in 
the center of the public debate and plenty of postal votes were sent to British 
households. In particular, „Leave‟ campaign delivered a hundred million leaflets and 
sent half a billion advertisements digitally (Shipman, 2017). Admittedly, Downing 
Street and „Stronger In‟ considered the economy, public services, the cost of the EU 
and immigration as separate issues, while „Vote Leave‟ managed to fuse them into one 
campaigning issue.  
Before the publication of the „corrosive of public trust‟ letter, Brexiters had printed a 
new poster which illustrated footsteps walking through an open door shaped like 
passport, with the slogan ‗Turkey (Population Seventy-Six Million) is joining the EU‘ 
(Shipman, 2017). Additionally, Penny Mordaunt underlined that the entry of Turkey 
into Europe might pose threats to Britain‟s security due to the fact that Turkey is a 
country with a high crime rate and ―the government will not be able to exclude Turkish 
criminals from entering the UK‖ because of the free movement laws of European 
Union. She also claimed – inaccurately – that Britain could not veto Turkish accession. 
Cameron called Mordaunt‟s assertions ―absolutely wrong‖ and his team accused „Vote 
Leave‟ of lying particularly on the grounds that Turkey would join the EU. 
Subsequently, the Prime Minister proceeded in a provocative statement, risking a 
diplomatic incident. He affirmed that Turkey is not expected to join the EU any time 
soon, since they applied in 1987 and “at the current rate of progress they will probably 
get round to joining in about the year 3000‖ (Shipman, 2017). 
Despite the criticism, „Leave‟ campaign continued to promote the Turkish issue 
because it had a clear influence on voters. Ryan Coetzee reproved Brexiters for using 
mendacious propaganda in an environment where feelings of distrust and xenophobia 
were fueling populist movements across the West. Correspondingly, „Stronger In‟ 
members believed they should also provide a solid answer to voters regarding 
immigration. Coetzee suggested that there should be a package of measures proposals 
to alleviate the impact of immigration especially on the impoverished areas and their 
overstretched public services. However, „Stronger In‟ did not want to place too much 
emphasis on the matter since, according to Andrew Cooper‟s polling, the economic 
risk would overshadow the immigration issue. The pollster had conducted „regression 
analysis‟, examining the explanatory power of various words, phrases and policies. He 
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concluded that arguments on immigration had little influence on voters and people who 
were determined to vote „Leave‟ because of immigration, they would not reverse their 
decision.  
 
7. Breaking Points; Jo Cox’s Murder 
 
On 16 June, a week before the referendum day, the Labour MP, Jo Cox, was attacked 
and murdered in the middle of the street. Based on the testimony of witnesses, the 
media reported that the perpetrator had yelled “Britain First” when he attacked her.  
Two days later, the 52-year-old Thomas Mair, who had links to an American-Neonazi 
group, the National Alliance, was arrested and charged with the murder. When he 
appeared at the Court and asked to confirm his name, he replied ―my name is death to 
traitors, freedom for Britain‖ (Shipman, 2017). 
The House of Commons was recalled for a day to pay tributes to Jo Cox, while 
Cameron cancelled the biggest Remain rally in Gibraltar, where he was due to appear 
in front of 15,000 people. Brexiters also cancelled a rally in Birmingham and 
suspended the operation of „Vote Leave‟. Admittedly, there was wide concern among 
those people involved in the campaigns about whether the Labour Mp was murdered 
due to her views for Brexit and whether her death would affect the referendum‟s 
outcome.  
Subsequently, „Stronger In‟ sent an email to invite volunteers to take part in a 
conference call. The email also appeared in one of Vote Leave‟s fake accounts and two 
senior staff managed to join in the conference, where Will Straw argued that ―people 
have been pulled up short by Jo Cox‘s death. It is now time to make a very positive 
case for why we want to be in the European Union―, and ―call out the other side for 
what they have done to stir division and resentment he the UK‖ (Shipman, 2017). A 
transcript of his speech was leaked to Day Telegraph and it was claimed that „Stronger 
In‟ was exploiting the MP‟s death. Moreover, Steve Baker advised his colleagues in 
Leave campaign not to respond to Remainers‟ attacks or make public statements 
regarding the murder of Jo Cox (Shipman, 2017). 
On the other hand, Nigel Farage was subjected to severe criticism because of a 
provocative poster about immigration, which he had unveiled a few hours before Cox 
was killed. It depicted a long stream of migrants standing at the Croatian-Slovenian 
borders under the slogan „Breaking Point‟. When the poster was first released on the 
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advertising vans, it had attracted minor interest. After the incident though, it became 
the centre of public debate about whether the Ukip leader was inciting racial hatred, 
and whether that feeling had fuelled both Cox‟s murder and Leave‟s lead in the 
opinion polls. Farage‟s initial plan was to launch six separate posters during the last 
week, and that was the first one. Both Michael Gove and Boris Johnson condemned the 
action and tried to deter him from publishing the rest of those posters. Farage handled 
the issue based on the instructions of Bank‟s campaign strategist, Andy Wigmore, who 
noted that the Ukip leader ―did not apologize for the poster, he apologized for the 
timing of the poster – and that set the whole news cycle going again‖ (Shipman, 2017). 
Admittedly, that was another tactic to keep the immigration issue in the headlines. 
The immediate perception in both the media and the campaigns was that Jo Cox‟s 
killing would benefit the Remain side. Leave campaigners believed that the „Breaking 
Point‟ poster „had offended polite opinion‟ and they would be affected by association 
(Shipman, 2017). However, Henry De Zoete had conducted focus groups discussion 
and reported back to „Vote Leave‟ that people did not accuse Brexit campaign for her 
death. In the final days, polls indicated a small lead for Remain which might have 
given a false comfort to „Stronger In‟, since many voters were reluctant to admit to 
pollsters they were backing Brexit after Cox‟s murder (Shipman, 2017). 
8. Debating Points 
 
It was commonly admitted that both campaigns had deployed the most structured 
minds and the best political communicators in Britain to help them build an effective 
strategy during the debate-battles for Brexit. 
Leave campaigners‟ success was based to a great extent on Brett O‟Donnell‟s 
assistance and guidance. O‟Donnell – also known as the „candidate whisperer‟ – had 
cooperated with George W. Bush in 2004 elections and prepared Mitt Romney for his 
2012 debate with Obama. He explained to Vote Leave‟s team that debates are 
„messaging opportunities‟ because people are given the chance to influence the public 
by using the campaign‟s most effective lines. In the first meeting of the group, 
O‟Donnell created a messaging document and provided instruction to his colleagues on 
how to respond to Remain‟s attacks, while in the second preparation session, he 
arranged a practice debate with some of stuff playing the Remain side (Shipman, 
2017). Their own attacks and offensive arguments were scripted. 
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On the other hand, Craig Oliver advised Cameron not to engage in a face-to-face 
debate, especially with Johnson and Gove. Instead, he arranged for the Prime Minister 
three solo appearances, one of which included to share the same platform with Nigel 
Farage and face the audience‟s questions. Notably, in summer 2015, the Ukip leader 
had negotiated with ITV executives to appear in one of the program‟s debates. 
Although „Vote Leave‟ won the designation, ITV did not change its decision. 
Nevertheless, the fact that Cameron would have to confront with Nigel Farage did not 
concern Craig Oliver, who regarded the Ukip leader to be an easy opponent and a 
referendum vote-loser (Shipman, 2017).  
Cameron‟s first media appearance was on 3 June, when he was interviewed by the 
political editor of Sky News, Faisal Islam. The interview would be followed by an 
audience question-and-answer session. To Cameron‟s evident surprise, Islam appeared 
to be sarcastic, asking the Prime Minister ―What comes first? World War III, or the 
global Brexit recession?‖ . Cameron, who was reduced to calling his interviewer 
―glib‖, found himself in an even more uncomfortable position in Q&A, when a 
literature student accused him of using „scaremongering‟ as a way to win votes. 
According to journalists and campaign‟s spin doctors, it was a bruising encounter, 
which also proved the depth of anti-EU feeling in Britain. 
The following evening, Michael Gove was due to appear in the same program and 
Brett O‟Donnell helped him to prepare. He put Gove under pressure by testing him 
repeatedly with any possible question and interrupting him during the practice 
interview. Brett O‟Donnell explained to the politician that every question was a chance 
to convey his messages. He also interviewed him about his personal life and urged him 
to seize on the fact that Euroscepticm grounded in his own past. In his Sky appearance, 
Gove proved to be sharp-witted by making astute turns of phrase and relentlessly 
advocating „take back control‟. He also followed O‟Donnell‟s advice and made a 
reference to personal experiences stating to the audience that his father ―had a fishing 
business in Aberdeen destroyed by the European Union and the Common Fisheries 
Policy‖. When Faisal Islam questioned the existence of the free-trade area, which 
Gove hoped Britain would join after Brexit, stressing the fact that there was no relevant 
website, Gove won applause by replying, ―Most of the people in this audience don‘t 
have their own personal website. I don‘t doubt that they exist‖ (Shipman, 2017). 
Subsequently, Gove was asked why more businesses and financial institutions were not 
backing Leave. He avoided to provide a direct response and tried to change the subject 
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of the question by answering, ―I think the people of this country have had enough of 
experts…I‘m afraid it‘s time to say, ‗You‘re fired!‘‖, which proved to be his most 
memorable line. Although he deliberately committed a logical fallacy, his answer had a 
positive impact on the voters. Gove‟s performance – unlike Cameron‟s – exceeded 
expectations and constituted a key moment in the campaign. 
On 7 June, the performances of Cameron and Farage would be judged against each 
other but the two party leaders would not appear on stage together. The Ukip leader 
had recruited a team of advisers to help him craft his arguments. However, Farage 
faced a difficult situation in front of the ITV audience, especially when a young black 
woman blamed him on his anti-immigration rhetoric, which might increase the fear and 
discrimination of Black British people. She asked him whether he was encouraging 
racism and Farage appeared to be nervous defending himself as a supporter of the 
Commonwealth. It was a heated encounter but the Ukip leader admitted later that they 
would not gain more votes if he suddenly deployed a different rhetoric and gave the 
wrong impression of being a social democrat (Shipman, 2017). Cameron benefited 
from the fact that he appeared second in the ITV program and handled the public‟s 
questions more comfortably than the last time, even though he faced severe criticism 
particularly on his „tens and thousands‟ immigration pledge (Shipman, 2017).  
Two days later, the two opposing campaigns were prepared for the first three-way 
debate. After a long period of avoiding blue-on-blue attacks, „Stronger In‟ decided to 
follow a different approach and place an all-female line-up to challenge Boris Johnson 
and deploy ad hominem attacks against him. ITV had separately approached the 
Scottish minister, Nicola Sturgeon, whose debate performances during the previous 
general elections had attracted media‟s attention. Labour Party appointed the shadow 
leader of the Commons, Angela Eagle. The team was completed with the appointment 
of a Conservative MP, the energy secretary Amber Rudd. According to Oliver, 
Johnson would face difficulty in tackling the assaults from three female politicians 
during a ninety-minute debate. However, Johnson would be also surrounded by two 
women, the Labour MP Gisela Stuart and Andrea Leadsom, who was Rudd‟s deputy at 
the Department of Energy and Climate Change (Shipman, 2017). 
In preparation sessions, „Stronger In‟ practiced a role-playing debate and tested attack 
lines in order to interact and properly coordinate their moves. An additional advantage 
for „Remain‟ campaigners was the assistance that Alastair Campbell, Tony Blair‟s old 
spin doctor, rendered to the team. He advised them on how to deal with the hostile 
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press and how to communicate their strategy through the debate. Moreover, he pointed 
out that they should always think about the rebuttal on every opponent‟s response. 
On the other hand, O‟Donnell urged Jonson, Leadsom and Stuart to give weight on the 
important arguments and address the audience while answering each question. He 
advised them not to react to any provocation and repeat constantly the campaign‟s line 
„Take back control‟. Remarkably, he also encouraged all three candidates to humanize 
each issue and present themselves to the public as people and not merely as politicians. 
Leadsom was advised to refer to her experience as a businesswoman and a mother, 
while the German-born Stuart decided to incorporate in her answers the fact that she 
was a mother, a grandmother, as well as an immigrant. They did practice debates for 
hours, with the two female politicians intervening to halt any attacks on Johnson 
(Shipman, 2017). 
The ITV show was the biggest live debate on the EU referendum. It was characterized 
by Vote Leave‟s teamwork and message discipline but Remainers‟ performance got the 
headlines. Boris Johnson came under sustained attack by the three Remain women 
during the televised debate. Amber Rudd accused the lead figure in Brexit campaign of 
being motivated by personal leadership ambitions, saying that ―I fear that the only 
number Boris is interested in is Number 10‖. In her closing remarks, she made a point 
of disparaging her Tory colleague. ―As for Boris, he is the life and soul of the party but 
he‘s not the man you want driving you home at the end of the evening‖, Rudd claimed. 
On the other hand, Johnson accused Stronger In of scaremongering and negativity. He 
also defended and justified the £350 million figure, which Sturgeon called a 
„whopper‟, while Eagle urged him to remove it from Vote Leave‟s bus. Throughout the 
debate, Johnson tried to keep his composure and confirmed to the voters that Britain 
would ―prosper as never before‖ out of the European Union. Furthermore, Stuart used 
her ―I am an immigrant‖ line during the conversation on immigration, which worked 
perfectly according to Stephenson (Shipman, 2017). 
The Remain side was satisfied with the outcome of the ITV debate. Will Straw 
recalled, ―If we weren‘t careful, this would be Boris Johnson moment. We preferred to 
be huge ranking over an attack on his character, rather than whatever he was trying to 
get across‖ (Shipman, 2017). Leave side felt relieved that Johnson did not respond to 
their ad hominem attacks, believing that Boris was the most popular politician in 
Britain and the Remain team‟s offensive attitude would have the exact opposite effect. 
Indeed, Ryan Coetzee did focus-group sessions and concluded that the verbal assaults 
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were counterproductive. More specifically, the undecided/persuadable voters, who 
constituted the Remain campaign‟s target, did not like the personal attacks. As a result, 
Stronger In decided to adopt a different policy in the BBC debate at Wembley 
(Shipman, 2017). 
Cameron‟s last broadcast appearance was on the BBC‟s Question Time EU Special. 
The most significant moment was when a member from the audience referred to Prime 
Minister‟s renegotiation and claimed that the deal was not legally binding. The 
questioner compared Cameron to a ―21st-century Neville Chamberlain‖ and asked the 
Prime Minister how he could make pledges based on that deal, when in fact ―a 
dictatorship in Europe can overrule it‖ (Shipman, 2017). Cameron responded with 
passion, citing Winston Churchill: ―At my office I sit two yards away from the cabinet 
room where Winston Churchill decided in May 1940 to fight on against Hitler. The 
best and greatest decision perhaps anyone has made in our country. He didn‘t want to 
be alone. He wanted to be fighting with the French, the Poles and the others. But (…) 
he didn‘t quit on democracy, he didn‘t quit on freedom‖. Cameron moved around the 
stage, gesticulating wildly during his speech and pointing with his fingers. He 
continued stating, ―We want to fight for those things today. You can‘t win if you‘re not 
in the room. You can‘t win a football match if you‘re not on the pitch‖ (Shipman, 
2017). It could be noted that Prime Minister deliberately used first-person plural – “We 
want” – to establish a personal connection with the listeners and some virtue words – 
such as democracy and freedom – in order to influence the public. It could be also 
indicated that he committed the „red-herring‟ fallacy by diverting the question and 
redirecting the argument to another topic in order to distract the audience. 
Nevertheless, he succeeded in following the instructions of the debate coach, Bill 
Knapp, who had advised him to show emotion during his performance.  
Subsequently, Cameron gave an interview to the Sunday Times, arguing that a Brexit 
vote would be a ―one-way ticket‖ with ―no going back‖. That argument had been 
regarded as a powerful one with women, according to Ryan Coetzee‟s focus groups. 
However, there was a common perception within „Stronger In‟ that Cameron had lost 
the force of his impact due to the fact that he was viewed as a Tory politician rather 
than a prime minister. As a result, a public speech was organized two days before the 
poling day, where Cameron would present himself as the nation‟s leader addressing to 
the country. According to Tim Shipman‟s view, the „Remain‟ side ―was stretching the 
purdah rules to breaking point‖ (Shipman, 2017). The Prime Minister managed to 
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make his economic message appeal to families: ―As you take this decision whether to 
remain or leave, do think about the hopes and dreams of your children and 
grandchildren – they know their chances to work, to travel, to build the sort of open 
society they want to live in, rest on this outcome‖ (Shipman, 2017). 
The following event was going to be the biggest debate in British history. The 
representatives of the campaigns were due to appear at Wembley Arena and speak in 
front of 6,500 people. Τhe BBC producers had initially envisaged two politicians and 
another public figure on each team.  ‟Stronger In‟ chose the leader of the Scottish 
Party, Ruth Davidson, who was a committed pro-European. It was believed that she 
was the only Tory politician with an influence to Labour supporters, mainly because of 
her accent, which was familiar to Labour voters living in the north of England. „Labour 
In‟ campaign preferred to keep Eagle but Lucy Thomas proposed Sadiq Khan 
(Shipman, 2017). The third team member would be Frances O‟Grady, Britain‟s top 
trade unionist and the general secretary of the TUC. Stronger In‟s team resolved to be 
better-organized in that debate and, during their preparation, they recorded an opening 
and closing statement, which Coetzee played to a focus group in order to get their 
approval. 
„Vote Leave‟ would deploy once again the main advocate of the campaign, Boris 
Johnson, and Gisela Stuart, the German immigrant. Regarding the third member, 
Brexiters had originally chosen the businessman and former minister Digby Jones but 
they eventually deployed Andrea Leadsom due to her previous good performance. 
According to Henry de Zoete, the electorate did not trust businessmen. On the other 
hand, the women liked the fact that Leadsom referred to her experience as a mother. 
Brett O‟ Donnell advised his team to frame the debate as they were promoting hope, in 
contrast to the opponents, who were promoting fear and loathing (Shipman, 2017).  
The three main sections of the debate were the economy, immigration issue and 
security. The Remainers‟ basic plan was to give weight and win on the economic 
arguments, and to focus on security to overcome their disadvantage on immigration. 
Conversely, they did not in fact manage to get public‟s attention during the economic 
section, whereas they performed better than expected on immigration. Surprisingly, 
neither side succeeded in winning on the security issue.  
In the opening section of the BBC debate, Ruth Davidson accused Boris Johnson and 
„Vote Leave‟ of “lying” about the cost of EU and Turkey. They also clashed on jobs, 
where the Scottish MP quoted a Johnson‟s previous claim that some jobs might be lost 
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from Brexit. Johnson cleverly retorted that the Remain side was deploying once again 
Project Fear in an effort to conceal the fact that they could not make a positive case 
about staying in Europe. However, as the debate reached the immigration topic, Mr 
Khan accused the Leave side - which had campaigned hard on the issue – of utilizing 
“Project Hate” instead of “Project Fear”. Moreover, Frances O‟Grady demonstrated 
that „Vote Leave‟ had never pledged to limit net migration if people voted for Brexit. 
Subsequently, Davidson made her final statement for „Stronger In‟: ―You have to be 
100 per cent sure, because there‘s no going back on Friday morning, and your 
decision could cost someone else their job‖ (Shipman, 2017). Nonetheless, it was 
Boris Johnson‟s line which received loud acclamation. He argued: ―I believe this 
Thursday can be our country‘s Independence Day‖. His idea was based on the fact that 
there were posters everywhere advertising the movie Independence Day, which had its 
premiere on 23 June.  
It could be indicated that although „Stronger In‟ managed to approach the debate in a 
more positive and affective way, Johnson was the person that deeply affected public‟s 
emotions. Ηowever, the outcome of the referendum the following day would determine 
which campaigns‟ strategy had been more successful.  
 
9. ‘All Out War’ 
 
Tim Shipman considers the operation of a campaign a ―sophisticated business‘‟. 
According to his book „All Out War „, there are four identified ways to run an election 
campaign successfully and gain advantage over competitors. First of all, the author 
refers to the ‗air war‘, which constitutes the campaigners‟ attempt to convey their main 
messages through the mass media. This policy is heavily based on making emotional 
or intellectual appeals to persuade the undecided voters and sway supporters of the 
opposing side. The second way is called the ‗ground war‘ and concerns the role of 
activists in delivering the campaign literature. They also contribute to the campaign‟s 
efforts to increase the voter turnout in elections. Moreover, Tim Shipman analyses two 
additional hi-tech battlefields, which have emerged the last twenty years. The first one 
constitutes a different version of the air and ground war and is known as ‗cyber war‘ 
because it is conducted on social media. Facebook and Twitter are the most influential 
platforms, where campaigns can advertise their messages in a more direct and effective 
way and promote their views to people who do not get informed from the traditional 
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media. However, behind all these practices lies the ‗data war‘, which includes the 
usage of sophisticated data-mining methods to analyze the electoral register and create 
databases with information from voters‟ social media accounts. These data help the 
campaign to identify which demographic or interest group of the country is susceptible 
to its messages in order to send emails and activists towards specific households. A 
campaign could achieve its objectives supposing that all the above operations are 
properly combined and reinforce each other.  
Most of the above chapters have described the ‗air war‘ of the two opposing sides in 
Britain‟s EU referendum. However, both Brexit and Remain campaigns built strategies 
based on all those techniques to target voters. The most significant example of Vote 
Leave‟s digital operation constituted the creation of a £50 million football prediction 
competition. The campaign was supposedly offering the staggering price, which 
claimed that amounted to the sum UK sent to Europe every day, to anyone who 
managed to predict correctly the winner of all games at Euro 2016.  
The real reason behind the competition was Brexiters‟ attempt to gather personal 
information about the participants, who were asked to fill in their name, email and 
address. These data proved extremely useful for the campaign, since half a million 
people were sent text messages reminding them to vote on polling day (Shipman, 
2017). The attraction of football was also used by „Stronger In‟, as an effort to entice 
young men who would not otherwise have been interested in the referendum. 
Remainers devised a product that allowed football fans to estimate which English team 
might lose more foreign players if immigration controls were imposed (Shipman, 
2017). 
Admittedly, the web strategy helped both sides to make judgments about where to 
deploy their ground forces. Based on their databases and their social media operations, 
the campaigns selected key areas to send leaflet commuters. Special pamphlets were 
delivered by „Stronger In‟ to pensioners and young voters, while „Vote Leave‟ 
recruited volunteers to put adverts outside schools and supermarkets in specific 
neighborhoods.  
On reflection, both campaigns used a range of communication methods and employed 
a number of rhetoric strategies to reach the desired outcome. Tim Shipman argues that 
politics is first and foremost ―a results business‖. ―There are no hung Parliaments in 
referendums, only victory or total, irreversible defeat‖ (Shipman, 2017). Τhe result of 
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the EU referendum would ultimately determine which campaign‟s policy was more 
effective. 
 
C. The Result: BREXIT; Why? 
 
Britain‟s EU referendum, also known as Brexit referendum, resulted in 51.9 per cent of 
voters being in favor of leaving the EU. The outcome provoked considerable debate 
regarding the factors that contributed to the „Leave‟ campaign‟s victory, leading to 
various explanations and theories. The issues stressed by the Remain and Leave 
campaigns received significant attention in studies, since they played a vital role in 
forming the public attitudes towards the EU. The cost-benefit calculations and the 
related risk assessments, the cues from political and business elites and the feelings of 
attachment to a wider community are considered to be the main parts of Britain‟s 
campaign that eventually shaped people‟s opinion and the result of the 2016 
referendum (Clarke et al., 2017). 
Most of the analyses that have been conducted focus on identifying the economic, 
social and demographic factors behind the Brexit vote. More specifically, it has been 
indicated that people‟s decision to vote 'Leave' or 'Remain' can be attributed to various 
individual characteristics, such as, education, age, income and employment status 
(Clarke et al., 2017, Curtice, 2017, Soudis et al., 2018). In broad terms, people with 
higher levels of education, higher incomes, working in higher skilled and professional 
jobs, and belonging in younger age groups opted for „Remain‟, and vice versa for 
„Leave‟ (Soudis et al., 2018). Undeniably, it is not as simple as that, since many 
intellectuals and young voters across England and Wales also supported Brexit. The 
outcome of the UK‟s referendum should be approached at more than one level in order 
to be adequately explained. Based on an extensive literature review, this paper will 
mainly attempt to interpret how people voted to „Leave‟, examining the circumstances 
under which voters‟ attitudes were formed and the various tactics and strategic plans of 
the campaigns that might have affected people‟s final choice.  
First of all, it could be argued that the referendum‟s result was the culmination of three 
decades of scepticism towards the EU (Shipman, 2017). All those years of sustained 
Euroscepticism among politicians, citizens and in large parts of Britain‟s media could 
not be reversed in just eight months of campaigning. The Conservative MP and then 
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Minister of State at the Department of Health, Alistair Burt, admitted that the EU battle 
―was lost a long time ago with the relentless drip, drip of anti-European propaganda‖ 
(Shipman 2017). It should be also taken into account that British people have always 
had a weaker sense of European identity compared with their counterparts in other EU 
member states (Dennison et al., 2018). This suggests that the vote to „Leave‟ could be 
regarded as a statement about Britain‟s national identity, and everything that involves – 
in that case about the economic and political future of the country. Moreover, the role 
of the media during the campaign should be also taken into consideration. For almost 
thirty years, the British national press has been inciting Eurosceptic sentiment. 
Stronger In‟s media operation “was unable to compete with the populist message 
orchestrated by tabloid newspapers such as the Sun‖ (Wring, 2016). 
Regarding the circumstances in which the referendum was held, there is a second 
explanation of the outcome, provided mainly by Remainers. It has been claimed that 
the EU referendum occurred in a period when ―powerful forces that assisted the 
Leavers were sweeping the Western World” (Shipman, 2017). Brexit was considered to 
be another sign of the phenomenon that fuelled support for Marine Le Pen in France 
and Donald Trump in the US. This included a revolt against the effects of globalization 
and a rejection of political elites, expressed chiefly by people from working-class 
communities, who protested about the low wages and the pressure on local services 
emerging from rising immigration. It also included the growth of what analysts call a 
„post-truth‟ culture, ―in which voters are persuaded by the volume rather than the 
accuracy of an announcement‖ (Shipman, 2017). 
Based on the above, many scholars tried to assess the relative importance of the issues 
stressed by the two opposing sides, as well as the various tactics used by both 
campaigns to convey their key messages. British people were bombarded with 
warnings from the „Remain‟ side about the economic consequences the country would 
face if they voted to leave the EU. They deployed all kind of experts – the IMF, the 
OECD, the CBI, the IFS – to persuade the public that the economic growth would be 
affected, unemployment would rise and the pound would rapidly fall after Brexit. 
However, the „Leave‟ campaign was quick to denounce those warnings as “Project 
Fear” and propaganda based on negativity, dismissing all those experts as wealthy, 
unaccountable elites having their own vested interests. The result indicates that voters 
were reluctant to believe and accept the arguments of recognizably establishment 
figures, while Leave side was accused of fomenting that feeling of distrust. On the 
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contrary, „Vote Leave‟ preferred to concentrate on the question of fiscal transfers 
instead of the economics of leaving the EU (Curtice, 2017). Their main argument was 
that the EU membership costed the UK £350 million a week, an amount of money that 
could be rather spent on the country‟s health service, ―a form of public spending that is 
always relatively popular‖ (Curtice, 2017). The assertion was heavily disputed not 
only by Remain campaigners but also by the Treasury Select Committee and the UK 
Statistics Authority, which described it as potentially misleading. However, it was a 
powerful political slogan, which attracted voters‟ attention by being placed across the 
side of the campaign‟s bus. Admittedly, the publicity that was generated by the 
criticism gave also publicity to the fact that the UK was still a net contributor to the 
budget of EU (Curtice, 2017). In that sense, it provided an effective illustration of how 
Britain could be better off outside the EU.  
The principal theme of immigration also favored the Leave side, since the result 
suggested that people were concerned about the levels of migration into Britain over 
the past ten years and their impact on society. Crucially, Leave campaigners 
demonstrated that the EU was responsible for about half of migration, while they 
pointed out that due to the freedom of movement provisions, Britain could not 
sufficiently control the numbers of migrants coming from the EU to live and work in 
the UK. There were also suggestions that migration from the EU potentially exposed 
Britain to a terrorist threat (Curtice, 2017). Moreover, the Leave campaign attempted to 
combine the migration issue with the subject of national sovereignty, reminding voters 
that Britain had to implement EU directives, which the government might have 
opposed in the Council of Ministers, and accept any judgments made by the European 
Court of Justice. The fact that decisions should be taken in London rather than Brussels 
constituted a central argument of Leave side. On the other hand, the Remainers 
realized that the migration crisis was ―their Achilles‘ heel‖ and, for the most part of 
the debate, they tried to divert the campaign onto a territory more comfortable for 
them, most notably the economy, rather than try to oppose the Leave side‟s arguments 
directly (Curtice, 2017, Oliver, 2016). However, some attempt was made to suggest 
that Brexit might threaten collaboration with the police services and the intelligence of 
other EU countries, and consequently increase the risk of terrorism (Curtice, 2017). 
It could be indicated that the economic case of the Remain campaign failed in the face 
of the strong anti-immigration sentiment and the effective „take back control‟ slogan of 
Leave side. Nevertheless, the final result should be attributed to the communication 
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failures of the Remain side (Hughes, 2016). David Cameron and his allies made a 
series of decisions that may have contributed to their defeat. The Prime Minister put 
himself in the front and centre of the Remain campaign and framed people‟s choice as 
a question of trust. Having set high expectations about his ability to secure a 
fundamental reform in Britain‟s relationship with the EU, it was inevitable that his deal 
– which included only a few concessions – would be dismissed as inadequate by 
Eurosceptics in his party. Apart from this, it is worth noting that Cameron used to be 
one of the most eurosceptic Conservative Prime Ministers in the UK‟s history, until he 
tried to change his position in February after his negotiations with Brussels (Shipman, 
2017). Having said nothing positive about Europe during his premiership, it was 
impossible to convince the public of the advantages of the EU membership. 
Furthermore, George Osborne‟s analysis showed that he and Cameron miscalculated 
―the scale of division within the Conservative Party that left nearly half their MPs 
against them‖ and tried to plan their strategy without knowing whether two of the 
party‟s key figures, Boris Johnson and Michael Gove, would be on their side 
(Shipman, 2017). It was commonly admitted that Johnson and Gove‟s decision to 
support Brexit had a material effect on the outcome. Regarding especially Johnson‟s 
choice to back the Leave campaign, Tim Shipman argues that he was the embodiment 
of the nation at that moment. ―Every voter weighted self-interest and the national 
interest: By plumping for Brexit after personal agonies, Johnson mirrored the decision 
of the country‖ (Shipman, 2017). Undeniably, both cabinet ministers gave to the Leave 
campaign intellectual heft and publicity, which otherwise it might have lacked. At that 
point, it should be also mentioned that Cameron was particularly concerned about 
keeping his party united after the EU referendum and hence he avoided any blue-on-
blue confrontations during the campaign. That attitude deprived him of an opportunity 
to defend himself and his team against the personal attacks repeatedly launched by the 
opposing side. Eventually, Cameron‟s failure to persuade his own Tory voters of the 
Remain case stemmed ―not just from weak communication and weak strategy but from 
a lack of real commitment to the strategic case for the EU and for the UK to play a 
strategic role in Europe‖ (Hughes, 2016).  
Overall, it has been argued that „Vote Leave‟ ran a superior campaign to their pro-EU 
rivals, on the grounds that it was more disciplined, better organized, with tighter 
messaging. On doorsteps, posters and during the TV debates, Brexit side always 
followed a careful plan, devised by the campaigning masterminds, Dominic Cummings 
83 
 
and Matthew Elliott, based on focus groups and internal research. On the other hand, 
an important deficiency of the „Stronger In‟ operation was its failure to pursue an 
offensive strategy, mainly because of Andrew Cooper‟s polling. Although studies of 
the polls after the referendum suggested that „Leave‟ was ahead throughout the 
campaign, Cooper‟s polling put „Remain‟ ahead, which undoubtedly strengthened his 
team‟s belief that they would win (Shipman, 2017). The fact that they did not deviate 
from their original planning up to the final day was due to a degree of complacency in 
„Stronger In‟ that their policy was actually working. 
Last but not least, the contribution of Steve Baker and his parliamentary guerillas was 
also significant to the Vote Leave cause, depriving the government of key advantages 
(Shipman, 2017). „Conservatives for Britain‟ succeeded in changing the referendum 
question from yes/no to remain/leave, which may have been worth several percentage 
points to the Leave side, while they also saved the four-week purdah period, allowing 
„Vote Leave‟ to secure a better broadcast coverage particularly at the moment ―when 
their attacks became most potent‖ (Shipman, 2017). Similarly, the neutrality of the 
Conservative Party prevented Cameron and his allies from canvassing data which 
otherwise they could have utilized to their advantage. Taken together, all these factors 
may have been decisive to swing the balance in favor of Leave. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
In theory, the Remain campaign had a number of advantages. First of all, staying in the 
European Union constituted the status quo option, while Brexit represented a choice of 
radical change (Mullen, 2016). Additionally, much of the establishment, not only in the 
UK but internationally, supported Remain. Finally and most importantly, until the 
official „purdah‟ period, Prime Minister David Cameron had the ability to exploit the 
political communication machinery of the country in favor of Remain. Although the 
Conservative Party was officially neutral, the Remain side could utilize some of the 
party‟s resources (e.g. voter data and activists), along with the official support of the 
Labour Party and its own political communication devices (Mullen, 2016). On the 
contrary, the Leave campaign, which lacked the support of any establishment or 
political party and was prohibited from accessing the state‟s resources, had to build its 
operation largely from the beginning. Eventually, in terms of political communication, 
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both the Remain and Leave campaigns deployed effective strategies and similar digital 
approaches. The critical difference, though, lies in the fact that the Leave campaign 
was more successful at targeting than the opposing side (Mullen, 2016).  
With respect to the rhetoric of the EU referendum campaign, the Leave side emerged 
victorious by making long-standing assumptions about how Britain was being 
―mistreated‖ by the EU (Crines, 2016). In line with this, their arguments were mainly 
based on immigration, expense of membership and loss of sovereignty. Conversely, the 
Remain side tried to highlight the fiscal stability, the access to the single market, and 
also the potential risk to the UK‟s economy in case of Brexit. Both campaigns 
deployed a variety of rhetorical devices to deliver their messages. First and foremost, 
the Aristotelean modes of persuasion – pathos, logos and ethos – are particularly traced 
in their rhetorical positions. It could be indicated that „Vote Leave‟ used appeals to 
pathos, while „Stronger In‟ relied more upon logos-driven assertions. This significant 
difference framed their debate and the kind of arguments both sides used (Crines, 
2016). For instance, by appealing to pathos, the Leave campaign used the potential 
risks of Turkey joining the EU and the fear of immigration to incite a sense of dread 
regarding the future. Aided by a eurosceptic and sympathetic media, „Vote Leave‟ was 
well positioned to form their narrative during the debates. On the other hand, the 
Remain campaign used appeals to logos by pointing out that Turkey was unlikely to 
join the EU and that Britain gained considerable economic and social benefits from EU 
membership. However, the Leave side declared victory because it also appealed 
effectively to ethos, the third of Aristotle‟s rhetorical devices, which is related to 
character and credibility. More specifically, Boris Johnson and Nigel Farage presented 
themselves to the audience as credible sources, constructing a public image that 
seemed to be likable and open, while David Cameron and his allies – such as John 
Major and Tony Blair – epitomized the distant establishment (Crines, 2016). The 
premise of this rhetorical strategy concerns to persuade the voters that your abilities 
and background reflect their own. Based on this, Leave campaigners demonstrated that 
they understood and sympathized with the electorate‟s concerns (Crines, 2016).  
On reflection, there were a number of strategies and psychological operations 
employed by both sides, which can explain the outcome. The Leave campaign argued 
repeatedly about immigration and sovereignty, the two issues that resonated most with 
the public, whereas the Remain side failed to convince the voters about the impacts on 
economy.  Ultimately, the EU referendum seemed to be highly divisive, highlighting a 
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wide range of geographical, social and other differences in the United Kingdom. 
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